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INTRODUCTION
The world has recently seen a tremendous expansion in
countries using extraterritorial laws'-laws that regulate the
activities of foreigners outside a country's borders.2 In the United
States, domestic laws now commonly regulate extraterritorial conduct
and transnational litigation has blossomed.3 No longer limited to the
antitrust and commercial contexts, 4 courts apply all sorts of public and
private laws to activity occurring abroad.5 Academics have encouraged
1. Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty - U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International
Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 650-56 (2002) (describing extraterritorial civil and criminal
litigation in Australia, Canada, England, and Europe and arguing that these sort of
extraterritorial cases are no longer unique to the United States). For a detailed description of the
growth of countries using extraterritorial laws, see generally Austen Parrish, Reclaiming
International Law From Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (describing how
extraterritorial litigation is no longer an American phenomenon).
2. A law is extraterritorial when a court applies a domestic law to foreigners for conduct
occurring beyond the territorial borders of the nation-state in which the court sits. The
extraterritorial application of domestic law is referred to as the exercise of legislative
jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402 (1987); cf. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment
Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1218 n.3 (1992) (explaining that a case "involves
extraterritoriality when at least one relevant event occurs in another nation").
3. Some have described the three largest exports of the United States as "rock music, blue
jeans, and United States law." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 281 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The
Extraterritorial Application of United States Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 257 (1980)); see also
Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1297,
1299-1301 (2004) (describing the expanding number of transnational cases); Harold Hongju Ko,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183 (1996) (describing the rise of
transnational litigation); cf. Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal
Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 389 (2005)
(exploring the reasons for the increased use of extraterritorial laws in the United States).
4. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 505-09
(3d ed. 1996) (describing extraterritorial laws in a variety of commercial cases, including
antitrust, securities, and others); see also Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU
Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 159 (1990) (describing how in both the United
States and the EU, extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust and competition law has become
routine).
5. UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION, 58TH Sess. (2006),
Annex E, p.516, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reportsl2006/english/annexes.pdf
(describing and providing examples of how the use of U.S. domestic laws to regulate conduct
occurring beyond U.S. borders has become "increasingly common"); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum,
Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 251, 255 (2006) (analyzing domestic cases
that "seek to apply a shared norm, in domestic courts, for the benefit of the international
community"); Harold Hongju Ko, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2348-49 (1991) (suggesting transnational public law litigation merges formerly distinct types of
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the trend, finding the notion that law should be tied to territory to be
an archaic remnant of a preglobalized world. 6 In an age of
globalization, the argument goes, law should find national and
political borders of little significance.7 The enactment and application
of extraterritorial laws have become unexceptional.
A doctrinal culprit has sustained this growth in
extraterritoriality. At the heart of most extraterritoriality cases lies
the effects test.8 Developed at a time when legal realism captivated
legal academia, 9 the effects test permits a U.S. court to exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction-and Congress is assumed to have intended
to regulate-when an activity has direct or substantial effects within
litigation). See generally Parrish, supra note I (listing contexts in which U.S. laws have been
applied extraterritorially).
6. See, e.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 61-79 (1992) (criticizing territoriality); Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale:
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 184 (1991) (suggesting
that "the world in which a presumption against extraterritoriality made sense is gone,"
criticizing the presumption against extraterritoriality, and arguing that territoriality should be
abandoned); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International
Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 736 (1995) (arguing that Liberal analysis
concludes the presumption of territoriality "makes no sense"); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David T.
Zaring, Extraterritoriality in a Globalized World, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=39380 ("In such a [globalized] world, tidy circles demarcating national
jurisdiction, even based on an expanded conception of territoriality, became either impossible or
meaningless.").
7. Numerous scholars have explored the continuing relevance of territoriality outside the
legislative jurisdiction context. See, e.g., Thomas J. Biersteker, State, Sovereignty and Territory,
in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 157, 167-72 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002)
(discussing the continuing relevance of concepts of sovereignty and territory to international
relations); Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality: International Relations and American
Law, in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 219, 220, 234-48 (Miles
Kahler & Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006) (arguing territoriality is "decreasingly important as a
jurisdictional principle" in a globalizing world); John Gerrard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond:
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 148-63 (1993)
(discussing the evolution of modern territoriality); Saskia Sassen, Territory and Territoriality in
the Global Economy, 15 INT'L SOC. 372, 373 (2000) ("[W]e are seeing processes of incipient
denationalization of sovereignty - the partial detachment of sovereignty from the nation state.").
For a specific example, Paul Berman recently argued that in an age of globalization, territorial
borders should have little significance in jurisdictional questions. Paul Schiff Berman, Dialectical
Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 929, 932-38 (2006) [hereinafter
Berman, Dialectical Regulation] (exploring how to accommodate non-territorial based norms
through legal pluralism and arguing that territoriality is eroding); Paul Schiff Berman, Global
Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1168 (2007) [hereinafter Berman, Global Legal
Pluralism] (arguing for a conflict approach different from "territorially-based sovereigntism" and
universalism); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311,
329-70 (2002) [hereinafter Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction] (leveling ten critiques against
territorial based rules for jurisdiction).
8. See infra Section IC (listing and describing cases applying the effects test).
9. See infra Section I.B (describing changes in legal theory and the move from legal
formalism to legal realism).
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the United States.10 Academics have embraced the effects test (albeit
in slightly different forms) as a panacea to all extraterritorial
jurisdictional dilemmas.11 And although once condemned abroad,12
other countries have started to follow suit, permitting jurisdiction over
activities that have effects within their territory. 13 In short, under
current doctrine, the effects test is the linchpin to understanding the
geographic reach of domestic laws.
But here's the rub. Although the effects test has become central
to what many scholars perceive to be a correct modern analysis for
10. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1986)
(setting forth the effects test).
11. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts-of-Laws Theory: An
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARv. INT'L L.J. 101, 141, 154 (1998) [hereinafter
Dodge, Judicial Unilateralism] (applying a unilateral analysis favoring U.S. law whenever
conduct abroad causes substantial and foreseeable effects that the U.S. law was intended to
prevent); William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 99 (1998) [hereinafter Dodge, Understanding the Presumption] (arguing
that the effects test should reverse the presumption of territoriality); Larry Kramer,
Extraterritorial Application of American Law after the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to
Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 751 (1995) (arguing for application of
U.S. law over foreign conduct that produces a substantial effect in the United States); Russell
Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the
Utility of a Choice-of-Law Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1825 (1992) (arguing for a rebuttable
presumption in favor of applying U.S. law whenever conduct abroad produces substantial and
foreseeable effects in the United States); cf. Born, supra note 6, at 88 (arguing that legislative
jurisdiction should be treated as a choice-of-law problem with U.S. law applied if the United
States has the most significant relationship to the parties and the transaction); Andreas
Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflicts of Laws, International Law, and
Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 373-83 (1979) (arguing
that U.S. law should be applied only if reasonable under concepts of international comity,
regardless of the effect in the United States).
12. BORN, supra note 4, at 507 (noting that U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction on
the basis of the effects test has led to "vigorous and repeated protest" from other countries).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
cmt. n.3 (1987):
[Germany and m]ost other states of Western Europe, including Austria,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland, as well as Canada and Japan (but not the United Kingdom or
the Netherlands), have accepted the effects doctrine as applied to economic
effects, either in their legislation or in political decisions, though with varying
interpretations of the doctrine.
see also Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States
and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 27-37 (1992) (describing how Europe
has embraced an effects test for extraterritorial legislation); James J. Friedberg, The
Convergence of Law in an Era of Political Integration: The Wood Pulp Case and the Alcoa Effects
Doctrine, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 289, 309-18 (1991) (describing history of European resistance to the
effects test); Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International
Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 204 (2005) (explaining how by the end of the 1980s the
"EC had incorporated the effects test into its own competition law").
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legislative jurisdiction, 14 courts rarely apply it appropriately. 15 This is
problematic. Properly determining the geographic scope of U.S. law is
important. Because of globalization of trade and commerce and the
proliferation of electronic methods of communication, transnational
disputes have become commonplace 16 and the intensity of these
disputes has escalated.17 To solve these disputes, plaintiffs
increasingly seek to apply U.S. laws to foreign conduct.18 Yet as U.S.
courts apply domestic laws extraterritorially, other countries have not
only periodically retaliated, 19  but have also begun to accept
extraterritoriality and use it for their own ends. 20 Indeed, as
14. See supra note 11 (citing articles advocating the use of the effects test). Legislative
jurisdiction is a nation-state's authority to prescribe or regulate conduct. See infra note 30.
15. See infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text (examining courts' application of the
effects test and describing its failures).
16. See Stephan B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1456 (1991)
(noting that international litigation is of "increasing practical important and substantial
theoretical interest"); Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and
Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 799 (1988) ("It is
trite but true to observe that disputes between United States nationals and people from other
lands have been increasing steadily and doubtless will continue to do so."); see also Austen
Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Alien Defendants,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2006) (describing increases in international litigation,
globalization, and the prevalence of parallel proceedings and class actions); Willibald Posch,
Resolving Business Disputes Through Litigation or Other Alternatives: The Effects of
Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 363. 367 (2004).
17. David J. Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: Global Markets as a Challenge to National
Regulatory Systems, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 287, 301 (2004) (explaining how global markets "tend to
increase the likelihood of [jurisdictional] conflicts and their intensity").
18. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff's Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102, 104 (discussing the Second Circuit's decisions that broadened the reach
of U.S. human rights law). For a discussion of how nongovernmental organizations have
influenced the field of human rights, see Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, From the Cold War to
Kosovo: The Rise and Renewal of the Field of International Human Rights, 2 ANN. REV. LAW SOC.
Sci. 231 (2006).
19. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (describing methods of retaliation); cf.
RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 6 (1964)
("This pretension supports the treatment of national policy, interest, and value as if they were
universal. Such behavior invites retaliation, engenders distrust, and undermines those actual
and potential claims of international law to make stable the relations among the entire
community of states"); David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the
Reach of National Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185, 187 (1984) (describing the negative impacts of
extraterritoriality).
20. See, e.g., Born, supra note 6, at 67-68 (describing extraterritorial laws in foreign
countries, including France, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland); Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose
Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1059-
60 (2004) (explaining how criminal complaints or investigations, in the past decade, have been
instituted before courts in Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, for atrocities throughout the world); Beth
Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and Historical Context, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 450-56 (2002) (describing extraterritorial litigation in Australia, Canada,
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extraterritorial laws are more frequently applied worldwide, the very
purpose of legislative jurisdiction-to avoid conflict between countries
and the harms that conflicts inevitably cause-is threatened. Stated
differently, the story of modern extraterritoriality is one where the
effects test, like a Fifth Business,21 has driven the plot. And the
mischief it has caused has displaced the "golden voices" 22  of
territoriality and international law that once governed legislative
jurisdiction analysis.
A thoroughly practical consideration also is in play. Although
courts find increasingly more transnational cases on their dockets, 23
the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence for determining when U.S.
law regulates foreign conduct has failed to keep pace with the changes
globalization has wrought. Condemned as incoherent and
convoluted, 24 a patchwork of incompatible rules presently governs
England, Europe, and South Africa, and arguing that these sorts of transnational cases are no
longer unique to the United States).
21. The famous novelist Robertson Davies described Fifth Business in his masterwork of
the same title, as a character in theater and opera who has no opposite-the odd man out,
neither heroine nor her lover, rival nor villain-yet who is essential to the plot. ROBERTSON
DAVIES, FIFTH BUSINESS 266-67 (1971).
22. Id. at 267 ("The prima donna and the tenor, the contralto and the basso, get all the best
music and do all the spectacular things, but you cannot manage the plot without Fifth Business.
... [T]hose who play it sometimes have a career that outlasts the golden voices.")
23. As one example, a landmark extraterritorial case found its way to the Supreme Court
just this last year. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL
2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (denying motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds), affl'd,
452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 858 (2008). A slew of commentary from
both sides of the border underscores the importance of these kinds of extraterritorial cases. See,
e.g., Jutta Brunnee, The United States and International Environmental Law: Living with an
Elephant, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 617, 628 (2004) (stating that one of the "cornerstone principles of
environmental law, the prohibition against causation of significant transboundary
environmental harm," can be traced back to the Trail Smelter case between the United States
and Canada); Neil Craik, Transboundary Pollution, Unilateralism, and the Limits of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Second Trail Smelter Dispute, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 109, 109-21 (Rebecca M.
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006) (examining the Trail Smelter decision and asserting
that "the EPA's turn to extraterritoriality has the potential to be a positive development for
addressing transboundary environmental harm"); Kevin R. Gray, Transboundary Environmental
Disputes along the Canada-U.S. Frontier: Revisiting the Efficacy of Applying the Rules of State
Responsibility, 43 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 333, 385-90 (2005) ("As transboundary environmental
disputes are not expected to wane in number or importance, one can expect reinvigorated efforts,
or at least legal advocacy to this effect, to give meaningful application to the rules of state
responsibility."); Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Dejc Vu: Extraterritoriality, International
Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water
Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 368 (2005) (concluding that "the use of international
arbitration provides an effective.., way to resolve transboundary water pollution issues").
24. GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 638 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the "confusion for private parties and lower
courts" based on the courts' different approaches to legislative jurisdiction); Mark P. Gibney, The
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legislative jurisdiction.25 Some scholars go so far as to describe the
Court's extraterritoriality decisions as patently inconsistent, if not
hopelessly confused.2 6 Not surprisingly, without sufficient direction,
lower courts have been ill-equipped to decide the scope of Congress's
legislative jurisdiction. 27 In some instances, courts have reached
contrary results on nearly identical facts.28 Courts would be well
served then if they had greater guidance in this area of law.
This Article provides that guidance. It seeks to clear away the
confusion that mars analysis of extraterritorial questions in
international cases. In Part I, the Article provides a brief historical
overview of the legal doctrine governing legislative jurisdiction. It also
introduces a key doctrinal manifestation of the demise of the
presumption against extraterritoriality in law: the effects test. Part II
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal
of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 297, 301-03 (1996) (describing inconsistencies in doctrines surrounding
extraterritoriality); Kramer, supra note 6, at 180 (describing the inconsistencies that exist in
doctrine related to extraterritoriality); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the
Allocation of Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975, 975, 978-84 (1994)
(explaining how "[clonflict of laws is a source of constant embarrassment" because it suffers from
a "lack of theoretical coherence" and is in theoretical disarray).
25. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 658-59:
With almost haphazard nonchalance, the Court has applied several
fundamentally different rules of construction in international cases ....
Unfortunately, the Court has neither acknowledged the existence of these
different approaches, nor provided guidance as to when it will apply one,
rather than another. The result is confusion for litigants and lower courts,
and arbitrary, unpredictable results.
Dodge, Judicial Unilateralism, supra note 11, at 121-34 (describing three conflicting approaches
to extraterritoriality taken by the courts).
26. Joseph E. Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust Violations - Paths
Through The Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 519 (1971) (describing the confusion
that exists in extraterritorial antitrust cases); Gibney, supra note 24, at 302 (describing the
"patently inconsistent applications of the extraterritorial presumption").
27. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 179-80 (describing how appellate courts rely on the U.S.
Supreme Court to "revisit an issue and sort through disparate strands to restore order" and
consistency in the law); James E. Ward, "Is That Your Final Answer?" The Patchwork
Jurisprudence Surrounding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 715,
716 (2002) ("[L]ower courts continually embrace divergent approaches to extraterritoriality, the
resulting mblange being wholly inadequate to adjudicate the growing tide of transnational
litigation."); cf. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 646 (listing cases that apply "a wide variety
of formulations of the [effects test]").
28. See Gibney, supra note 24, at 301 (lamenting the courts' inconsistencies and noting that
"[iun some instances the courts have read very ambiguous statutory language quite expansively,
but in other cases they have taken equally broad language and given it a territorial
interpretation"); Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome': Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 601, 634-35 (1990) (arguing that
courts have treated market and nonmarket cases differently without justification when deciding
whether laws should apply extraterritorially).
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then explains how tossing territoriality aside in transboundary cases
is a mistake. In a modern, globalized, integrated economy,
territoriality should play a larger role in answering jurisdictional
questions, not a smaller one. While many scholars have focused on
how extraterritorial laws impinge on foreign interests, Part II
describes how extraterritoriality threatens American interests: a
threat that has been unwisely underestimated or, at least,
unjustifiably downplayed. Finally, in Part III, the Article counsels for
judicial and legislative restraint. Having examined how courts apply
the effects test-and assuming that courts, respectful as they must be
of precedent, 29 will be disinclined to ignore it-the Article argues that
the effects test is best understood as a narrow limit on congressional
power, not as a doctrinal command that reverses the presumption
against extraterritoriality. The Article concludes by examining why
territoriality as a constraint on state power should be reinvigorated.
Courts should be much more reluctant than they have been in finding
that Congress has enacted a law with extraterritorial reach. And
Congress would also do well to be more restrained than it has been
and enact extraterritorial laws in rare circumstances only.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Legislative jurisdiction is a nation-state's authority to prescribe
or regulate conduct. 30 It can be distinguished from adjudicative or
judicial jurisdiction, which is the power of a court to subject particular
persons or things to the judicial process. 31 When a state uses its
legislative jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of those outside its
borders, the law has been applied extraterritorially.
Two questions arise in any legislative jurisdiction analysis. The
first is whether Congress has the power to extend the force of domestic
29. A plethora of scholarship examines the role of precedent in judicial decisionmaking. For
some of the more well-known articles, see Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective:
From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill,
Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271
(2005); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedent, 87 VA. L. REV. 1
(2001); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
(1987); see also Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145,
179-212 (1978) (describing legislative jurisdiction); Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (1978) (defining legislative jurisdiction as "the power of a state to
apply its law to create or affect legal interests").
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
401(b)-(c) (1987); see also KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
AND VENUE 2 (1999). Examples of adjudicative jurisdiction include personal and subject matter
jurisdiction.
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law beyond U.S. borders. Congress's power to do so is nearly
unconstrained. 32 The second is whether Congress intended to regulate
extraterritorially when enacting specific legislation. Complicating this
question is the reality that Congress rarely specifies the geographic
reach of the laws it enacts. 33 The answer to this second question, and
the history of legislative jurisdiction, is one that begins with
territoriality, and ends, at least for now, with the effects test. This
history has been described elsewhere; 34 but the following summarizes
briefly how the effects test has come to dominate legislative
jurisdiction analysis.
A. An Era of Territoriality
The concept of territoriality as a limitation on sovereign power
has a venerable history. Beginning around the 1600s with the Treaty
of Westphalia, a nation's power was deemed to end at its border. 35 A
concept theorized by Dutch scholars,36 territoriality was a defining
32. Compare A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial
Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 384-417 (1997) (arguing that due process does not
limit the territorial reach of federal law), with Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 2, at 1223
(arguing that the Fifth Amendment limits federal extraterritoriality, but only minimally);
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 880 (1989) (arguing that Congress's respect for the territorial limitations of
international law accords with the intent of the Framers of the Constitution). A recent student
note provides an overview of the issue. Alex Ellenberg, Note, Due Process Limitations on
Extraterritorial Tort Legislation, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 554-63 (2007) (defining "legislative
jurisdiction" and examining early Supreme Court jurisprudence governing jurisdiction).
33. Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and
Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 11, 15, 17 ("In certain
statutes, Congress has specified the proper extraterritorial reach. More commonly, however, it
has not. In the resulting exercise in statutory construction, courts often find little guidance in the
legislative history about the extent to which the statute was designed to apply to transnational
disputes."). Dodge, Judicial Unilateralism, supra note 11, at 145 (explaining how there is rarely
good evidence of congressional intent of the statute's geographic scope).
34. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? TERRITORIALITY
AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 2009).
35. The Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, is credited under conventional wisdom as creating
an international political system based on territoriality. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia,
1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 28-29 (1948); see also Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2508 (2005) (explaining that "[t]he Westphalian conception of the
state represented a break with the past because it drew all legitimate power into a single
sovereign, who controlled absolutely a defined territory and its associated population").
36. D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English Private
International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 65 (1937); Arthur Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of
the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 190 (1942); see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State.Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241,
259 (explaining how Justice Story borrowed from Dutch theorist Ulrich Huber the concept of
sovereign authority that each sovereign had jurisdictional prerogative within its borders); James
Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of Judicial Jurisdiction in 19th Century
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feature of public international law.37  In international law,
territoriality-and the related concept of sovereignty-implied
external and internal independence. 38 Each nation-state possessed
exclusive jurisdiction within its territory and, in theory, each state
shared a legal equality with other states, despite economic or military
disparities.39 For international law, territorial borders limited and
defined the state.40
Conflicts-of-law doctrine shared international law's
commitment to territoriality. 41 Associated most famously with Joseph
America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73, 74-85 (1990) (describing how early American jurisdictional
principles developed from Dutch theorists, including Huber).
37. John H. Herz, Rise and Demise of the Territorial State, 9 WORLD POL. 473, 480 (1957)
("From territoriality resulted the concepts and institutions which characterized the
interrelations of sovereign units, the modern state system . . . . Only to the extent that it
reflected their territoriality and took into account their sovereignty could international law
develop in modern times."); see also S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at
18-19 (Judgment of Sept. 7):
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it
may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In
this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from
international custom or from a convention.
The Apollon, 22 U.S. 363, 370 (1824) ("The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own
territory, except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to control the
sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction.").
38. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (6th ed. 2003)
(describing the twinned concepts of external and internal sovereignty); Judith Resnick & Julie
Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1921-23 (2003) (distinguishing external and internal
territorial sovereignty); cf. Corfu Channel (U.K. & N. Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9)
(rejecting a state's claim of a right of intervention into the territory of another state, noting that
"[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of
international relations").
39. Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2509 (citing HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 78 (Richard Henry Dana, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 8th ed.
1866)). The doctrine of equality of states can be traced back to theorists like Hobbes and Bodin.
See, e.g., JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 7-9 (M.J. Tooley trans., Basil
Blackwell 1955) (1576); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XV (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1651).
40. Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders,
26 SCH. ADVANCED INT'L STUD. REV. 11, 11 (2006) (explaining how the international system is
based on "three central tenets: the notion of equal sovereignty of states, internal competence for
domestic jurisdiction, and territorial preservation of existing boundaries"); John Agnew,
Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, 95 ANN.
ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 437, 437 (2005) ("Implicit in all claims about state sovereignty as the
quintessential form taken by political authority are associated claims about distinguishing a
strictly bounded territory from an external world and thus fixing the territorial scope of
sovereignty.").
41. Conflict of laws is directly related to legislative jurisdiction issues: "Unless a state
possesses legislative jurisdiction over the issue in question, its law may not properly be selected
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Beale's writings42 and the First Restatement, 43 vested rights theory
determined what law applied to a particular dispute.44 Vested rights
theory was the handmaiden of territoriality because it "envision[ed]
that rights will 'vest,' or attach, in a particular jurisdiction, based on
the occurrence of certain events in that jurisdiction."45 Once rights
vested in one territorially defined jurisdiction, other jurisdictions were
required to respect them. As Beale explained, "the chief task of the
Conflict of Laws [is] to determine the place where a right arose and
the law that created it."46 For if "two laws were present at the same
time and in the same place upon the same subject, we should... have
a condition of anarchy."47 The theory, if crude, was pragmatic: "By
dividing the world into exclusive territorial units and positing that
rights vested in only one state," vested rights would "in theory avoid
the 'anarchy' of concurrent jurisdiction and assure uniformity in
choice of law decisions."48
Given this adherence to territoriality, regulation of
extraterritorial conduct was viewed as illegitimate-legislative
jurisdiction would not extend beyond borders.49  "Westphalian
sovereignty ... create[d] a system in which legal jurisdiction [was]
by choice of law analysis." BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 561; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 cmt. b (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a) & cmt. b (1987).
42. 1 JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); see also Elliott E.
Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361,
379-85 (1945) (describing Beale's vested rights theory and how it was advanced on the Court by
Justice Holmes).
43. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 378, 382, 383 (1934).
44. For a good overview, see LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 20-46 (2d ed. 1995)
(describing the "rise and fall of vested rights" and the influence of Beale and the First
Restatement); see also Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883,
890-91 (2002) (describing the vested rights approach to conflict of laws).
45. Trachtman, supra note 24, at 999; see also BRILMAYER, supra note 44, at 22 (describing
how rights would vest under Beale's vested rights theory).
46. BEALE, supra note 42, at 64.
47. Id. at 46; see also Cheatham, supra note 42, at 369, 379 (describing how under the
vested rights theory, each act is subject to one law).
48. Dodge, Judicial Unilateralism, supra note 11, at 113; see also BRILMAYER, supra note
44, at 23 (explaining how Beale's choice of law approach was believed to have certain practical
advantages, including predictability).
49. Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 268; see also Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets
Private Law Harmonization: The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 211, 255 (2005) (describing
how territorial limits on a court's power has taken many forms, including "the doctrine of lex loci
delicti (the law of the place of the wrong) in choice of law, the presumptive territorial limits of
prescriptive jurisdiction, the breadth of the act of state doctrine, and the great stinginess with
which res judicata and collateral estoppel were applied across borders"); Parrish, supra note 16,
at 8-13 (describing how concepts of territorial sovereignty guided personal jurisdiction doctrines
until after the Second World War).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
congruent with sovereign territorial borders."50 In Justice Story's
words, "every nation possesse[d] an exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction within its own territory," and "it would be wholly
incompatible with equality and exclusiveness of the sovereignty of all
nations, that any one nation should be at liberty to regulate either
persons or things not within its own territory."51 Or, perhaps Beale
was more to the point: "Since the power of a state is supreme within
its own territory, no other state can exercise power there .... It
follows generally that no statute has force to affect any person, thing,
or act outside the territory of the state that passed it."52
In the United States, the territoriality principle reached its
zenith in the 1800s. In 1812, Chief Justice John Marshall declared
that the jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is "necessarily
exclusive and absolute" and, accordingly, that territory demarcated
the limits of a nation's law. 53 Or, as Justice Holmes explained the
presumption against extraterritoriality a century later in the famous
American Banana case: "The general and almost universal rule is that
the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."54 Accordingly,
statutes were construed "to be confined in ... operation and effect to
the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and
legitimate power."55
Tethering power to territory made sense: the territoriality
principle-as a limitation on legislative authority-served important
goals. Conflicts of law, and the related law surrounding legislative
50. Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2509.
51. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 19, 21 (Hilliard, Gray & Co.
1834); see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 564 ("Story's view of international law was
highly influential in nineteenth-century America."); cf. The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824)
("The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its
own citizens"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) ("The authority of every tribunal is
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt
to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said
by this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse."); Mills v.
Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 486 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("[J]urisdiction can not be
justly exercised by a state over property not within the reach of its process, or over persons not
owing them allegiance or not subjected to their jurisdiction ... .
52. BEALE, supra note 42, at 311-12.
53. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); see also Sandberg
v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918) ('legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to
limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction."); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66,
122 (1825) (explaining that "no nation can prescribe a rule for others" and finding the United
States does not have the authority to nullify foreign laws); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241,
279 (1807) (turning to international law and territorial limits in defining personal jurisdiction).
54. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
55. Id. at 357.
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jurisdiction, sought to accommodate the competing policies of
independent sovereigns. 56 With the world carved up into separate
jurisdictional regions, territoriality became an easily applied principle
to decide whose law should govern. 57 Jurisdiction based on territory
served the goals of predictability and efficiency:
By establishing a priori that only the nation where an event occurs has power, it limited
states' lawmaking competence so that conflict was practically impossible .... The
rationale was simple: because sovereignty is defined by territorial control, any other
principle would be a source of friction and discord "inconvenient to the commerce and
general intercourse of nations."58
Yet by the mid-1900s, territoriality's heyday was over.
B. Territoriality's Demise
The demise of territoriality accompanied changes in legal
theory. In the nineteenth century, when territoriality held its greatest
sway, classic legal thought and legal formalism dominated the law.
Legal rules were "fixed, inexorable, and logically deducible."5 9 An
underlying assumption was that "law is a closed, logical system. '60
From a formalistic perspective, territoriality fit nicely with this
assumption. 61 Answers to legislative jurisdiction questions-as with
judicial jurisdiction questions-could be reduced to a simplistic
question: "Is the activity there?"
By the end of the Second World War, pragmatism, legal
realism, and other related theories had discredited (or, at least
56. Kramer, supra note 6, at 188-89.
57. See Gerber, supra note 17, at 293 (explaining how territoriality "has much value as a
conflict-avoidance mechanism because territory has well-defined and easily identifiable
boundaries," and that "[a]ssuming that relevant conduct can be identified, the task of identifying
the territory in which it occurred is easy enough, and thus it avoids jurisdictional overlaps").
58. Kramer, supra note 6, at 189 (citing ULRICH HUBER, DE CONFLICTU LEGUM, translated
in D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber's "De Conflictu Legum" on English Private
International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 66 (1937)); see also Gerber, supra note 19, at 193-
202 (describing the development of the jurisdictional paradigm).
59. Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257,
316 (1990) (citing MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 259
(1977)).
60. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 62 (1977):
Judges do not make law: they merely declare the law which, in some Platonic
sense, already exists. The judicial function has nothing to do with the
adaptation of rules of law to changing conditions; it is restricted to the
discovery of what the true rules of law are and indeed always have been. Past
error can be exposed and in that way minor corrections can be made, but the
truth, once arrived at, is immutable and eternal.
61. RAUSTIALA, supra note 34 (describing how territoriality fits with classical legal
thought).
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displaced) classic legal theory.62 Legal realists attacked the formalist
assumptions 63 that undergirded territorial approaches to law.64 The
power to regulate, realists argued, did not follow "naturally and
inevitably from some self-evident theory" like territoriality.65 As they
did with judicial jurisdiction, realists deconstructed the law and
pushed for "reasonableness" as the touchstone of any jurisdictional
analysis. 66 Territoriality-as a concept limiting law's geographic
application-lost some of its potency.6 7
Concomitant with changes in legal theory was the reality on
the ground. In the 1920s, the international cartel movement created
complex business relationships that crossed national borders. 68 In the
United States, the rise of the modern administrative state meant the
62. See id. (explaining how formalism gave way in the 1930s and 1940s to pragmatism,
functionalism, and legal realism, reflecting an interest in replacing territoriality with effects test
or interest-based jurisdiction (citing Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism 8 (Stanford Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Series, Working Paper No. 4, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=200732)). See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 32-64 (1995)
(describing the legal realist response to legal formalism).
63. BRILMAYER, supra note 44, at 33-46 (describing how legal realism challenged territorial
approaches to jurisdiction and choice of law); Kramer, supra note 6, at 192, 202, 208-10
(describing how the "[tlraditional choice of law theory had been thoroughly dismantled by a
realist critique demonstrating (among other things) that the territorial principle reflected
neither what states do nor what they should necessarily want in multistate situations").
64. BRILMAYER, supra note 44, at 35 (explaining how "[t]he legal realist approach was so
fundamentally antithetical to both the abstract concept of territorial sovereignty and Beale's
conception of vested rights"); see, e.g., WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ix (Harvard Univ. Press 1942) (criticizing the Conflict of Laws
approach developed by Beale and the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws); David F. Cavers, A
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 176-82 (1933) (explaining the
problems with existing approaches); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810-21 (1935) (criticizing formalist approaches to personal
jurisdiction); see also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale
to Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377, 379 (1966) (describing how scholars like Cavers, Cook, Leflar,
Lorezen, Rheinstein, Stumberg, and Yntema criticized the territorial approach embodied in the
First Restatement of Conflict of Laws).
65. Kramer, supra note 6, at 209; see also ERNEST LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE
CONFLICTS OF LAWS 11 (1947) ("The common law has not hidden in its bosom a logical set of
rules which can be derived from its notion of territoriality .... [T]he adoption of the one rule or
the other depends entirely upon considerations of policy which each sovereign state must
determine for itself.").
66. See Parrish, supra note 16, at 13-18 (citing sources and discussing the move to
reasonableness in jurisdictional analysis).
67. In the conflicts of law context, theorists after Beale offered multiple theories to replace
Beale's territorial rules that were embodied in the First Restatement. See, e.g., DAVID F. CAVERS,
THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965); BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1963) (proffering a variety of conflict of law theories); ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962); ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977);
ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965).
68. Gerber, supra note 17, at 293.
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dramatic expansion of comprehensive regulation. 69 As economies
became more interdependent, the pressure to regulate cross-border
activity increased. 70 For many, "an increasingly interdependent and
globalized world . . . rendered strict territorial limits on jurisdiction
increasingly unworkable."71 And, as international law was still in its
most nascent stages and seemed ill-equipped to address
transboundary challenges, expanding the geographic reach of domestic
laws to relieve those pressures appeared logical.
Territoriality had other problems that made it open to attack.
Not only was territoriality perceived as an insufficiently nuanced
concept incapable of solving jurisdictional questions in a modern world
with a fast-paced global economy, 72 its pedigree was also tainted.73
Some saw territoriality as having been used for regrettable ends. On
the one hand, the United States had hidden behind territoriality as a
means of limiting constitutional protections.7 4 In the international law
context, courts invoked territoriality-and the related concept of
69. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (2002) (describing how
"[i]n the New Deal and immediate postwar eras, domestic regulatory law expanded markedly in
the U.S. and across the globe"); see also RAUSTIALA, supra note 34 (describing the impact the rise
of the regulatory state had on concepts of territoriality); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986) (describing the evolution of the federal
regulatory system in the United States); Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 6, at 2-5 (connecting
the growth of extraterritoriality with the rise of the regulatory state).
70. For a discussion of how this occurred in the domestic context, see Stephen Gardbaum,
New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 506-09
(1997) (discussing how as states became interdependent, pressure resulted on the courts to
interpret the dormant commerce clause as protecting a single, common market, rather than the
states being divided into a series of markets).
71. Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2512; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1185 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (describing the "vastly altered economic climate
since the time of American Banana").
72. Several scholars have criticized territorial conceptions in a modern economy. See supra
note 7 (listing several scholarly works criticizing the concept of territoriality as outdated); see
also Born, supra note 6, at 1-2 (arguing against territorial approaches to legislative jurisdiction);
Turley, supra note 28, at 659-62 (arguing that courts should reverse the presumption that
statutes do not apply extraterritorially absent clear congressional intent to the contrary and
instead assume that statutes do apply extraterritorially absent clear congressional intent to the
contrary).
73. See BRILMAYER, supra note 44, at 247 (explaining how territoriality's "association with
the old-fashioned vested rights approach has given it something of a bad name" and that
"territoriality is currently out of fashion").
74. The Constitution has been held to have no extraterritorial effect. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor the laws
passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own
citizens." (citing Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909))).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:5:1455
sovereignty-to prevent enforcement of human 75 and indigenous
rights.76 Liberal internationalists disliked territoriality, preferring, as
a descriptive matter, to disaggregate the state and focus on interests,
not territorial power. 77 International realists,78 in contrast, while
using territory to define the state as a rational actor, were skeptical of
the territorial theories, believing that states should fend for
themselves and pursue their own state interests. 79 For realists, only
politics and power-not international legal norms tethered to
territoriality theories-should constrain state action.80 Extraterritorial
laws were thus acceptable only so long as they served American
hegemonic interests.8 1
C. The Rise of the Effects Test
As territoriality lost its hold over law,8 2 the prohibition against
extraterritoriality weakened to a mere presumption.83 Congress had
75. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Locating Culture, Identity, and Human Rights, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201, 206-07 (1999) (noting how governments raise claims of sovereignty to
limit human rights accountability).
76. Austen Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and the Development of
Indigenous Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 297-302 (2007); see also S. JAMES ANAYA,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-28 (2d ed. 2004) (describing how European
concepts of territorial sovereignty were antithetical to traditional ways indigenous groups
organized with decentralized political structures and overlapping spheres of territorial control).
77. David G. Post, The "Unsettled Paradox" The Internet, the State, and the Consent of the
Governed, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521, 540 (1998) (describing how liberal theory focuses
on interests, rather than territoriality and power).
78. International realists are now commonly associated with Sovereigntist or revisionist
scholarship. See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 72-76 (2006) (describing different approaches to realism); see also Oona A.
Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1404, 1405 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (describing Sovereigntists as nationalists or revisionists)); Peter J.
Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and its False Prophets, 79 FOREIGN AFF.
9, 9-15 (2000) (describing Sovereigntist theory).
79. BRILMAYER, supra note 44, at 41-46, 115 (describing international realism, its attack on
territoriality theories of choice of law, and its dismissal of "rules of international law as simple
sentimental nonsense"); Parrish, supra note 1 (describing Sovereigntist approaches to
international law).
80. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 36 (1951); see also
Parrish, supra note 1 (listing sources).
81. Tonya Putnam's empirical work traces how extraterritorial laws have been used for
instrumental ends. See Tonya Putnam, Courts Without Borders: The Domestic Sources of U.S.
Extraterritorial Regulation (Mar. 4, 2007) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
82. International law now recognizes several bases of jurisdiction that are decoupled from
territory. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987) (describing factors used to determine jurisdiction to prescribe, including territoriality,
effects, nationality, and protection); see also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
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the power to enact extraterritorial laws, but it was presumed not to
have used that power in most circumstances. The development of the
effects test, however, marked the beginning of the end for meaningful
territorial limits on legislative jurisdiction.
The precursor to the effects test appeared in the 1920s.84 The
Permanent Court of International Justice ("ICJ") in the famous Lotus
case set the groundwork by establishing a presumption in favor of a
nation's legislative jurisdiction, even over conduct occurring abroad.8 5
In that case, a French ship collided with a Turkish ship, causing
several of the Turkish passengers to drown.86 The ICJ sustained the
Turkish government's right to prosecute the French officer allegedly
responsible for the crash. The ICJ held that Turkey had jurisdiction
over acts occurring in French territory (i.e., aboard the French ship),
when its effects were felt in Turkish territory (i.e., on the Turkish
ship).87
After Lotus set the groundwork, other cases soon followed. In
1945, Judge Hand injected the effects test into U.S. law with his
landmark Alcoa opinion.88 In Alcoa, the Court held that the Sherman
Act applied to foreign conduct impacting the United States, even when
INTERNATIONAL LAW 317-25 (4th ed. 2003) (describing different principles of jurisdiction
recognized under international law).
83. Turley, supra note 28, at 607 ("What began... as a prohibition against the perceived
violation of international law through extraterritorial regulation became simply a legal test for
subject matter jurisdiction.").
84. Admittedly, "[a] few early American state court decisions also embraced very limited
versions of what would come to be known as the 'effects doctrine,' although such decisions appear
to have been rare." BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 566 n.27 (citing cases).
85. S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 16 (Judgment of Sept. 7),
available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07lotus/ (rejecting notions of
strict territoriality and finding that national regulatory efforts are presumptively valid); see
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 567-68 (describing the importance of the Lotus case in the
creation of the effects test); Gerber, supra note 19, at 196-97 (describing how the Lotus case led
to the creation of the "effects test" by undermining territoriality as a limiting constraint on
legislative jurisdiction); Gerber, supra note 17, at 293-94 ("In 1927, the Lotus case...
encouraged further expansion of [the objective territoriality principle's] scope" and "led to the
development of the effects principle .... ").
86. S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J., at 6.
87. Id. at 23 (explaining that "if... a guilty act committed on the high seas produces its
effects on a vessel flying another flag.., the same principles must be applied as if the territories
of two different States were concerned" and that Turkey had jurisdiction over effects felt within
its territory); see also Najeeb Samie, The Doctrine of "Effects" and the Extraterritorial Application
of Antitrust Laws, 14 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 23, 31 (1982) (describing the S.S. Lotus
holding).
88. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945)
(noting that agreements, though made abroad, are still unlawful if they are intended to affect
imports and actually do affect them). For an early analysis of the use of the effects test in the
criminal context, see Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 435 (1935).
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that conduct occurred abroad.8 9 Judge Hand declared that "it is settled
law 9° ... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its border that has
consequences within its borders that the state reprehends ... ."91 The
test asserted that activities abroad, even those of foreign citizens, may
be regulated because of their impact on interests within the nation-
state's territory. 92 The decision "ushered in [a] new era and marked a
dramatic and undeniable break with" the tradition of territoriality. 93
Coincidentally, 1945 was also the year the Supreme Court decided
International Shoe Co. v. Washington94-a case that interred
territoriality in the related adjudicative jurisdiction context. 95
Often seen as a tool for expanding American hegemony, the
effects test gained widespread currency among U.S. courts in the
years following Alcoa.96 In 1965, the Second Restatement of Foreign
89. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
90. Samie, supra note 87, at 29 (noting that despite Judge Hand's language, "Alcoa actually
represented a deviation from prior holdings of the United States courts").
91. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987) ("[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to ... conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory ...."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 18 (1965) (providing that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law to conduct outside its
territory if the effect of the conduct within the territory is substantial and if the conduct meets
certain other requirements); THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAW 36 (Dieter Lange & Gary Born eds., 1987)
(explaining how the effects test "authorizes application of national laws to conduct that, while it
does not take place on national territory, has certain 'effects' within national territory").
92. Samie, supra note 87, at 23 (citing Int'l Law Ass'n, Report of the Fifty-First Conference,
Tokyo, Japan, Aug. 16-22, 1964, at 369).
93. Courtney G. Lytle, A Hegemonic Interpretation of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in
Antitrust: From American Banana to Hartford Fire, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 41, 57
(1997).
94. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982) (explaining that personal jurisdiction is concerned with an individual's
liberty interest and is not intended to protect the territorial sovereignty of the states); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1977) (disclaiming the notion from Pennoyer v. Neff that
"territorial power is both essential to and sufficient for jurisdiction").
95. For a description of how International Shoe broke from the territorial jurisdictional
theories established in Pennoyer, see Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate
Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 692, 697-98 (1987)
(describing International Shoe as both a break with, and a refinement of, Pennoyer). I have
previously described how territorial concepts were discarded in the personal jurisdiction context,
even in international cases. See Parrish, supra note 16, at 49-50 (discussing the assertion of
jurisdiction over Canada in the Trail Smelter case). The same transformation occurred in other
areas. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-20 (1950)
(replacing territorial-based notice rules with rules focused on fairness).
96. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 642 (explaining how "Alcoa's effects test
rapidly gained wide acceptance in the United States"); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 (1969) ("Zenith's evidence, although by no means conclusive,
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Relations Law stated that federal statutes apply to "conduct occurring
within, or having an effect within, the territory of the United States."97
By the 1980s, the Court's adherence to territoriality as expressed in
the American Banana case, although "still often quoted," did not
reflect U.S. law. 98 And although other countries first challenged the
effects test as an illegitimate expansion of U.S. economic and political
hegemony 99-particularly in the 1950s through 1970s 100-by the 1990s
most countries had come to accept the doctrine as a valid basis to
exercise legislative jurisdiction. 10 1
was sufficient to sustain the inference that Zenith had in fact been injured to some extent by the
Canadian pool's restraints upon imports of radio and television sets."); Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 697 (1962) (finding that, "where the plaintiff proves a
loss, and a violation by defendant of the antitrust laws of such a nature as to be likely to cause
that type of loss," the jury can infer that a causal relationship exists); Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952) ("Congress has the power to prevent unfair trade practices in
foreign commerce by citizens of the United States, although some of the acts are done outside the
territorial limits of the United States."); Alford, supra note 13, at 9 ("The Alcoa 'effects doctrine'
rapidly gained acceptance in the United States.").
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 38
(1965) (emphasis added).
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415
cmt. n.2 (1987) (citing United States v. Sisal Sales Co., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) and United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)). For an argument for the primacy of effects in
choice-of-law analysis, see Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J.
883, 894-98 (2002).
99. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 569, 573, 648-50 (explaining how "post-War
assertions of U.S. legislative jurisdiction often aroused diplomatic protests and legal objections
from foreign states"); Alford, supra note 13, at 9 (exploring how "Alcoa [and its effects test] was
met with disapproval from abroad" and "frequently criticized"); P.M. Roth, Reasonable
Extraterritoriality: Correcting the "Balance of Interests," 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 245, 247 (1992)
(describing how "the response [to Alcoa] from foreign States made it clear that they were far from
accepting this broad-reaching jurisdiction of the American courts"); John B. Sandage, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J.
1693, 1698 (1985) (explaining that the effects test was perceived as 'Yankee 'jurisdictional
jingoism' [that] created wide-spread resentment"); see also 1 SPENCER WEBER WALLER,
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD §§ 4:16-17 (3d ed. 1997) (providing examples of
countries that enacted "blocking legislation" as a means of countering U.S. jurisdictional
assertions).
100. By the late 1970s, many countries had enacted blocking statutes in response to
perceived exorbitant assertions of jurisdiction. See P.C.F. Pettit & C.J.D. Styles, The
International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37
BUS. LAW. 697, 707-14 (1982) (listing blocking statutes).
101. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 569 (explaining that "recently, a number of
European states have begun to apply selected national regulatory statutes extraterritorially with
rigor approaching that of the United States"); Gerber, supra note 17, at 295 ("Resistance to the
effects principle outside the United States has weakened as increasing numbers of states have
recognized the value of applying their laws to conduct they consider harmful, regardless of where
it occurs."); Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 505, 511 (1998) (noting that the "European
Union appears to be moving towards acceptance of the American notion of jurisdiction based
upon 'effects'" and citing sources).
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Yet the effects test did more than legitimize a basis for
legislative action; it undermined the presumption of territoriality.
When Congress was silent as to a statute's geographic reach, the
courts had traditionally presumed Congress intended the statute to
apply only within U.S. borders. 10 2 In those circumstances, courts
required clear evidence of congressional intent to overcome the
presumption and find that the statute applied to conduct occurring
abroad.10 3 The presumption was founded on a "commonsense notion"
that Congress generally legislates "with domestic conditions in
mind."'10 4 With the advent of the effects test, however, if foreign
conduct substantially affects the United States, then
extraterritoriality is now often assumed. 10 5 Accordingly, courts have
employed the effects test to apply federal laws extraterritorially,
despite the lack of evidence that Congress intended this reach. 0 6 And
102. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991) ("It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States." (internal quotation omitted)); see also Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949) (describing the presumption against extraterritoriality).
103. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (requiring the "affirmative intention of Congress clearly
expressed" (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957))).
104. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993). For a discussion of the reasons for
the presumption against extraterritoriality, see Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual
Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 513-17 (1997) (describing reasons
for the presumption against extraterritoriality). The presumption "serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations." Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
105. See, e.g., Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006)
(noting "the well-established principle that the presumption [against extraterritoriality] is not
applied where failure to extend the scope of the statute to a foreign setting will result in adverse
effects within the United States"); In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding
presumption inapplicable when effects felt in the United States); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986
F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that "the presumption is generally not applied where the
failure to extend the scope of the statute to a foreign setting will result in adverse effects within
the United States" even if significant effects of the conduct are felt abroad); Tamari v. Bache &
Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 n.11 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding reliance on the
presumption "misplaced" when conduct outside the United States "could otherwise affect
domestic conditions"); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 925
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality is inapplicable when the
regulated conduct is "intended to, and results in, substantial effects within the United States");
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (rejecting presumption and finding
Securities Exchange Act to apply extraterritorially based on effects in the United States); see also
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption, supra note 11, at 124 (noting that U.S. legislation
should apply to conduct that affects domestic conditions regardless of where the conduct occurs).
106. See Bradley, supra note 104, at 519 (describing criticism of the presumption against
extraterritoriality and noting that "the courts have construed several federal statutes as having
extraterritorial effect despite the absence of clear extraterritorial language"); see also Kramer,
supra note 6, at 190-97 (examining situations in which courts have been willing to apply federal
statutes extraterritorially despite a lack of clear extraterritorial language); Turley, supra note
28, at 608-17 (same).
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although the presumption against extraterritoriality remains (at least
on the books), in reality it has lost almost all its influence.10 7
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the effects test had
killed off any guarantee that territoriality would constrain courts.
Although the test once required that the defendant intend the effect to
be felt in the United States, many courts now omit any intent
requirement.108 Some courts find extraterritorial jurisdiction even
when the effects seem insubstantial. As Kal Raustiala has explained:
"[T]he doctrinal reversal [was] so complete that, recently, the D.C.
Circuit went so far as to hold that even foreign plaintiffs could sue
foreign defendants under the Sherman Act for harms that occurred
overseas, as long as some harmful effect was felt within the United
States."10 9 Even in the environmental context-where territoriality at
one time applied with greater force 10 -the Ninth Circuit concluded
107. See Guzman, supra note 98, at 925 (noting that "[alithough the presumption against
extraterritoriality remains part of the legal landscape, it has suffered a significant loss of
influence"); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 38 (1965) ("Rules of United States statutory law ... apply only to conduct occurring within, or
having effect within, the territory of the United States .... "). That the effects test reverses the
presumption of territoriality is now accepted by academics and law students as almost black-
letter law, as demonstrated by a sampling of recently published articles. See, e.g., Paul
Boudreaux, Biodiversity and a New "Best Case" for Applying the Environmental Statutes
Extraterritorially, 37 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1115-17 (2007) (arguing that "spillovers" or effects reverse
the presumption of territoriality); Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Divided Infringement: Expanding
the Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 300-09 (2007) (arguing that the
extraterritorial application of patent law should be expanded through the effects test); Carrie
Greenplate, Comment, Of Protection and Sovereignty: Applying the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act Extraterritorially to Protect Embedded Software Outsourced to China, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 129,
160-65 (2007) (stating that the effects test permits a state to regulate extraterritorially); Joao C.
J. G. de Medeiros, Note, How the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Has Created a Gap in
Environmental Protection at the 49th Parallel, 92 MINN. L. REV. 529, 553 (2007) (arguing that the
effects test is an exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality).
108. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 646 (citing Sabre Shipping Corp. v. Am.
President Lines, 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) and United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)).
109. Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2515 (noting how the D.C. decision was overturned by the
U.S. Supreme Court); see also Slaughter, supra note 6, at 732 (explaining that "[alt its high
point, the effects doctrine permitted the application of U.S. antitrust laws to an alleged
conspiracy in restraint of trade between a Japanese parent company and its U.S. subsidiary
operating in Indonesia with regard to an agreement to ship logs to Japan" (citing Indus. Inv.
Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982))).
110. See ENVTL. LAW INST., STRENGTHENING U.S.-MEXIcO TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING THE USE OF THE BORDER AS A SHIELD
AGAINST LIABILITY 37-40 (2002) (noting that "the presumption against extraterritoriality has
been applied with greater force to environmental laws"); Mark R. Ruppert, Criminal Jurisdiction
Over Environmental Offenses Committed Overseas: How to Maximize and When to Say "No" 40
A.F. L. REV. 1, 14 (1996) (arguing that the "available commentary on the issue of extraterritorial
application of U.S. environmental statutes unanimously concludes that these laws do not apply
outside U.S. territory"); Anna D. Stasch, Arc Ecology v. United States Department of Air Force:
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recently that U.S. environmental laws can regulate Canadian
companies operating solely in Canada in accordance with Canadian
law.111 The court's reasoning underscored how completely the effects
test has overpowered the territorial presumption: if U.S. law seeks to
remedy harmful effects in the United States, then, according to the
Ninth Circuit, the law is not being applied extraterritorially,
regardless of where the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred. 112
Certainly, at times, courts have attempted to pull back from
the effects test. The Supreme Court has suggested that international
comity113 may limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.11 4
Drawn from conflicts-of-law doctrine'"15-referred to alternatively as
the balancing, rule of reason, or interest approach' 6-courts have
attempted to temper the effects test and infuse comity into the
jurisdictional analysis. 117 In some ways, comity became a substitute
Extending the Extraterritorial Reach of Domestic Environmental Law, 36 ENVTL. L. 1065, 1070-
72, 1078-84 (2005) (describing how environmental laws have been territorially limited, but
explaining how to achieve extraterritorial application of domestic environmental laws); Turley,
supra note 28, at 655 (explaining that environmental laws have been typically territorially
constrained).
111. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1075-77 (9th Cir. 2006).
112. For a recent critique of the Ninth Circuit's decision, see Libin Zhang, Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 559 (2007) (describing the "tortuous and
unsound reasoning" of the Ninth Circuit decision).
113. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (defining international comity as "the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens").
114. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, SA, 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004)
(explaining that a court should "ordinarily construeo ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable
interference with the sovereign authority of other nations" and noting the need to avoid conflicts
"in today's highly interdependent commercial world"); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583-92
(1953) (looking towards principles of international law in defining the reach of federal statutes
and adopting a multi-factor balancing approach); see also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F,2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying a balancing of interests approach);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976) (limiting the effects
test through a rule of reason or interest balancing approach that accounts for international
comity concerns).
115. See Brilmayer, supra note 33, at 48-68 (describing the interest analysis approach to
conflict of laws). The interest analysis approach to conflict of laws is, of course, most commonly
associated with Brainerd Currie's work in the 1950s and 1960s. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 67;
see also Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 RECUEIL DES
COURS 13 (1989) (describing the interest analysis approach to conflict of laws).
116. The jurisdictional "rule of reason" is believed to have been first described by Kingman
Brewster. See KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958).
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403 (1987); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR
REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 228 (1996) (describing the rule of
reason approach); Alford, supra note 13, at 10 ("To temper the harsh results created by the Alcoa
judgment, several Courts of Appeals have modified the 'effects doctrine' by incorporating a
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for territoriality-a way to moderate the jurisdictional analysis in a
particularly pragmatic, nonformalistic way. 118 But even then, the
Court has found international comity to apply in only the rarest of
circumstances. 119 And when comity does apply, significant questions
exist as to whether courts are able to evaluate foreign interests
meaningfully 120 or do so in a way that does not inevitably favor U.S.
interests.121 Comity as a preferred touchstone for legislative
'jurisdictional rule of reason' in order to show due regard, in the interests of international comity,
to the foreign sovereignty of third countries.").
118. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 653 (questioning whether comity is a "substitute
for the Charming Betsy presumption and the territoriality presumption"). In other ways, comity
analysis seemed to be a way for followers of Currie's interest analysis to reinvigorate interest-
based theories after they had been rejected in domestic conflict of laws.
119. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-98 (1993) (finding that
comity concerns come into play only after the court has determined that the acts complained of
are subject to the Sherman Act); Nat'l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d
Cir. 1981) (rejecting Timberlane's comity considerations and stating that jurisdiction is possible
only with an appreciable anticompetitive effect on this country's commerce); see also Kenneth W.
Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV.
289, 295-97 (1993) (explaining how Hartford Fire ignored comity concerns); Gerber, supra note
17, at 296 (explaining how the Court in Hartford Fire "appeared to dispense with balancing
considerations, at least for most cases"); Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 564 (2000) (explaining how the Hartford Fire case "dealt comity a
near death blow").
120. See Griffin, supra note 101, at 519 ("American and foreign judges, as well as
commentators, question the competence of judges to evaluate the diplomatic, national security,
and international economic issues [raised by the balancing test]."); Philip J. McConnaughay,
Reviving the "Public Law Taboo" in International Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 284-
85 (1999) (arguing that courts are not equipped to identify and balance the interests of multiple
countries); Michael G. McKinnon, Federal and Legislative Jurisdiction Over Entities Abroad: The
Long-Arm of U.S. Antitrust Law and Viable Solutions Beyond the Timberlane/Restatement
Comity Approach, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1219, 1277 (1994) (noting the courts' inherent tendency to
discount the strength of the foreign regulatory interests involved); see also Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 948-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("We are in no position to adjudicate the relative
importance of antitrust regulation or nonregulation to the United States and the United
Kingdom."); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ("The
judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate the economic and social
policies of a foreign country .... ").
121. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 575, 655 ("Other critics of the rule of reason
have argued that U.S. courts inevitably resolve interest-balancing tests in favor of U.S.
interests."); Alford, supra note 13, at 12 ("U.S. courts in ultimately every case found the balance
tipped in favor of asserting jurisdiction over the foreign entity except where the court found no
cognizable adverse impact on U.S. competitors' interests whatsoever .. "); Harold G. Maier,
Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 588-95 (1983)
(suggesting that U.S. courts have shown a parochial bias in applying the interest-balancing test);
McKinnon, supra note 120, at 1278 ("As long as there is more than a de minimis United States
regulatory interest, courts have refused to allow interest-balancing to defeat an otherwise
legitimate antitrust claim."); see also Laker Airways Ltd., 731 F.2d at 948-51 ("A pragmatic
assessment of those decisions adopting an interest balancing approach indicates none where U.S.
jurisdiction was declined when there was more than a de minimis United States interest ....
When push comes to shove, the domestic forum is rarely unseated."); cf. Spector v. Norwegian
Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 158 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('The fine-tuning of
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jurisdiction analysis proved short lived 122 and a poor means of limiting
extraterritoriality. 123
II. THE DANGERS OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Academics and courts have unwisely underestimated the
problems created by the effects test, and with it the problems
associated with countries applying their law beyond their borders. As
described below, the unwillingness to respect international comity is
not the primary concern, as valid as that concern may be.
Extraterritoriality is problematic because it poses a significant threat
to long-term American interests.
A. The Effects Test Examined
The effects test is problematic for both conceptual and
pragmatic reasons. The test presently provides no meaningful
constraint on the exercise of jurisdiction. At its inception in the 1940s,
the effects test had a limited impact. In a less interdependent world,
the likelihood of foreign corporations having an effect in the U.S.
market was small. But now, the "tremendous increase in cross-border
activity" has all but guaranteed an increase in overlapping
jurisdictional conflicts. 124 As famously once said in the antitrust
[extraterritorial] legislation.., would be better left to Congress. To attempt it through the
process of case-by-case adjudication is a recipe for endless litigation and confusion ....").
122. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests
in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 229-37 (2001) (describing
the rise and fall of interest balancing). For a discussion of interest-balancing in the domestic
conflict of laws context, see Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53 (1991).
123. See Philip E. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of
Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53, 57 (1995) (arguing that the balancing and
international comity approach has lost any influence); Waller, supra note 119, at 564-66 (noting
that with the Hartford Fire decision, and decisions by the lower courts following Hartford Fire,
"comity as a legal doctrine in the courts has seen better days and will rarely be successful" in
dismissing extraterritorial litigation and that now "[t]raditional comity concerns have little role
to play"). Many have criticized the comity approach. See, e.g., Jack I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign
Policy-Making in International Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24
LAw & POLY INT'L BuS. 461, 482-91 (1993) (arguing comity approach provides courts with
questionable power to affect foreign relations); James M. Grippandom, Declining to Exercise
Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction on Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate
Extension of the Judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395, 399-403 (1983) (questioning
legitimacy of reliance on comity); Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the International Application of
the Sherman Act: Encouraging Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130,
156-66 (1982) (criticizing comity in theory and in practice).
124. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance, 42 VA.
J. INT'L L. 931, 940, 943 (2002); see, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 573 (describing the
jurisdictional issues created by globalization); Brilmayer, supra note 33, at 18 ("Today's world,
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context, "everything affects everything." 125 The effects test thus gives
license for near universal jurisdiction. 126 In so doing, it has
"dramatically expanded the potential for concurrent jurisdiction and
its accompanying conflict potential."'127 In other words, the effects test
has permitted precisely what legislative jurisdiction is designed to
prevent: conflicts with foreign states. 28
The effects test has also encouraged courts to exercise
jurisdiction broadly. Because statutes are typically silent as to their
geographic application, courts must determine legislative jurisdiction
from this silence. 29 Once the effects test is embraced as a way to
reverse the presumption against extraterritoriality, declining to
extend jurisdiction becomes near impossible. The court presumes that
Congress intended to regulate whenever harm (an effect) is felt in the
United States, because surely Congress would wish to deter conduct
causing harm and provide redress for past harm. To reach a contrary
result, a court would need to account for foreign interests and then
find that those foreign interests trump the previously presumed, yet
fictional, congressional intent.1 30 But significant forces-and what
however, contains many foreign corporations whose activities have effects on American markets
solely as an incidental byproduct of their foreign activities.").
125. 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 255 (1978).
126. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 573 (questioning whether in today's global
economy the effects test permits almost limitless legislative jurisdiction); Berman, Global Legal
Pluralism, supra note 7, at 1182 ("[I]n an electronically connected world the effects of any given
action may immediately be felt elsewhere with no relationship to physical geography at all.");
R.Y. Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 159 (1957) (explaining how the effects test means there exists "virtually no
limit to a State's territorial jurisdiction").
127. Gerber, supra note 17, at 294.
128. Kramer, supra note 6, at 193.
129. Brilmayer, supra note 33, at 16-17 (criticizing courts for invoking a fictitious
congressional intent to give American regulations an overly expansive reach).
130. A significant number of scholars have questioned whether courts are competent to ever
account for foreign interests. Bradley, supra note 104, at 550; see also Richard B. Bilder, The
Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 830 (1989) (noting the
problems with domestic courts deciding issues involving foreign affairs); Jack I. Garvey, Judicial
Foreign Policy-Making in International Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of
Powers, 24 LAw & POLY INT'L BUS. 461, 462 (1993) (arguing that courts lack the ability to adjust
to diplomatic nuance and timing to respond to international politics); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1668 (1997) (explaining why courts
are poorly equipped to address questions involving foreign relations); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial
Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 567 (1966) (arguing
that many constitutional questions regarding foreign policy are nonjusticiable political
questions); John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton
Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 747, 772-75 (1997) (arguing that implementing foreign
policy through the courts is harmful to American interests because the judiciary lacks a strong
unitary voice, and that the federal judiciary, when compared to the executive branch, is
"decentralized, slow, and at times irrational"). Judges have made similar observations. See, e.g.,
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may be considered American xenophobia in certain contexts-pressure
courts to give short shrift to foreign interests. 131 This is not only
because of the vagaries of what those interests entail, 132 but because
"[t]he objections of other nations are likely only to become clear after
the commitment to the expansionist mode of statutory interpretation
has been made." 133
The ease with which courts employ the effects test is
troublesome for two other reasons. First, an excessive assertion of
jurisdiction is not easily remedied.134 Because the assertion is
"ostensibly premised on a legislative intent, judges lack the freedom to
take corrective action which they enjoy in dealing with the common
law."135 Second, many commentators have explained how basing
jurisdiction on effects creates a slippery slope once indirect injuries
are sufficient to constitute an effect. 136
These failings alone condemn the effects test, but it suffers
from other failings too: the test is difficult to apply and lacks doctrinal
clarity.1 37 Case law "tend[s] to reflect the confusion as to what
standard should be applied to determine not only what an 'effect' is,
but also to what degree such an effect must be present."1 38 Indeed, no
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (noting that resolution of foreign policy issues
"frequently turn[s] on standards that... involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably
committed to the executive or legislature"); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)
(noting that the conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the executive
and legislative branches); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 939, 949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(stating that courts are neither qualified, nor capable of properly balancing foreign policy
interests).
131. Cf. Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 82 (2004) ("The arguments for categorical ignorance of international law in
constitutional adjudication play on exaggerated fears: fear of foreign domination, fear of judicial
activism, fear of the unknown.").
132. See supra notes 120-21.
133. Brilmayer, supra note 33, at 20.
134. Id. at 16 (describing the role of courts in determining whether Congress intended
American law to apply extraterritorially and how "[p]resumptions of legislative intent are
something of a Frankenstein monster: Easy to create, but hard to control.").
135. Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?: A Comment on
Professor Brilmayer's Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 39 (1988).
136. Jennings, supra note 126, at 159 (describing the "very slippery slope"); see also BORN &
RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 573 (questioning whether the "effects doctrine" provides "almost
limitless legislative jurisdiction").
137. Commentators have described the development of doctrine under the effects test as so
confused as to be a "Great Grimpen Mire." Fortenberry, supra note 26. For general discussions of
the lack of clarity in the law addressing legislative jurisdiction, see supra notes 25-28. Congress
once noted the many different variations of the effects test employed by the courts. H.R. REP. No.
97-686, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490 (describing six different
variations of the Alcoa effects test).
138. Samie, supra note 87, at 24; see also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d
597, 610-11 (9th Cir. 1976) (summarizing cases adopting different versions of the effects test);
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consensus exists among courts and commentators on just how far
jurisdiction should extend.1 39 Courts are tempted to reach the
perceived "right result" instinctively in a particular case, no matter
the cost to doctrinal clarity and predictability. Any effect, even an
insubstantial one, in some contexts is sufficient.1 40 The effects test has
thus encouraged the judiciary to take on an essentially legislative
function by approaching each case on an ad hoc basis.14' But deciding
Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783,
871-72 (2004) (explaining that "there is a significant difference of opinion across countries with
regard to how serious the effects must be and whether there is some additional 'reasonableness'
requirement"). For discussions of the inconsistent application of the effects test, see Max
Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,
44 HOUS. L. REV. 285, 310-13 (2007) (describing confusion over the effects test and Congress's
attempt to cure the problem by amending the antitrust statute); Edward L. Rholl, Comment,
Inconsistent Application of the Extraterritorial Provisions of the Sherman Act: A Judicial
Response Based upon the Much Maligned "Effects" Test, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 435, 443-51, 471
(1990) (describing how the effects test now has several versions with courts splintered over the
type of conduct and degree of domestic effects necessary).
139. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 646-47 (describing the inconsistent application of
the effects test, regarding both the magnitude and the character of the effects required, and
citing cases); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: PRACTICE
AND PLANNING 342, 346 (3d ed. 2001) (describing the different expressions of the effects test and
its inconsistent application and citing cases). For a recent discussion of the inconsistencies in
applying the effects test, see Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard
Based on the Continuum of Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 97-102 (2006).
140. See, e.g., Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 n.8 (5th Cir.
1983) (rejecting the idea that the effects must be substantial before a court may exercise
jurisdiction in trademark case); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("Indeed, it is probably not necessary for the effect on foreign
commerce to be both substantial and direct as long as it is not De minimis."); see also Ocean
Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the sales of
trademark infringing goods in a foreign country may have a sufficient effect on commerce for the
purposes of jurisdiction); Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 489 F.2d 809, 811-12
(7th Cir. 1973) (finding jurisdiction when bottles and labels originated from the United States,
even though alcohol was produced and distributed in Panama).
141. Gibney, supra note 24, at 307:
[T]he judicial branch has taken the lead in applying U.S. law
extraterritorially. When doing so, the rationale that is always given is that
the courts are merely carrying out Congressional intent. That rationale,
however, has not fooled many, including judges themselves.... Beyond this,
it is important to note that the objection is not simply that the judiciary has
essentially taken on a legislative function; it is the fact that there has been
no institutional check ....
Courts have sometimes admitted the legislative nature of the analysis. See, e.g., Cont'l Grain
(Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979) ("We frankly admit that
the finding of subject matter jurisdiction in the present case is largely a policy decision."); Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) ("We freely acknowledge that if we
were asked to point to language in the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled
the [extraterritorial] conclusions, we would be unable to respond.").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
whether a law should apply to foreign conduct entails a decision better
left for Congress, not the courts.
In part, the root of these problems may be the effects test's
uncertain doctrinal underpinnings. Although spurred on by legal
realism in the postwar period, the effects test sits uncomfortably with
a realist approach to jurisdiction. Nor does the effects test fit well with
postrealist theories that brush aside territorial sovereignty. On one
hand, the effects test represents the rejection of territoriality as a
constraint on sovereign power. Yet the effects test is simultaneously a
theory of jurisdiction dependent on, and defined by, territorial
concepts. 142 Rather than considering interests of individuals, the test
only provides a court with jurisdiction when something (the effect)
occurs within a state's territorial boundaries. Ultimately, the effects
test destroys territorial restraints while simultaneously reaffirming
the necessity of territoriality as a means of determining jurisdiction.
B. Extraterritoriality's Difficulties
Unfortunately, the effects test is not just bad doctrine. It has
impacted what is happening on the ground, helping contribute to the
dramatic increase in the use of extraterritorial laws. "States today
regularly and increasingly assert prescriptive jurisdiction beyond their
territorial limits." 143 If a new era of global extraterritoriality has not
already dawned, then it is certainly near.1 44 But extraterritorial laws
are deeply problematic: they are inconsistent with democratic
governance and lead to other harms.
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402,
cmt. d ("Jurisdiction [based on effects felt within the United States] is an aspect of jurisdiction
based on territory."); Buxbaum, supra note 124, at 940 (noting that "those cases based
jurisdiction to prescribe on the existence of effects within the United States; in that sense, they
too remained rooted in considerations of territory").
143. Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2511.
144. See, e.g., VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
IN U.S. COURTS § 8.3 (2d ed. 2006):
There are many laws of the United States that have or may have
extraterritorial effect. A few of these laws that invited comment are the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (dealing with bribery), the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (dealing with boycotts), the Iranian Assets
Control Regulations (dealing with response to the hostage crisis), the Civil
Rights Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, and drug
enforcement laws.
Philip B. Dye et al., International Litigation, 40 INT'L LAW. 275, 299 (2006) (listing cases in 2006
where U.S. courts have considered "extraterritoriality in disputes involving the federal habeas
corpus statute, as well as intellectual property, antitrust, securities, employment, disabilities,
tort claims, criminal law, and immigration issues").
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1. Irreconcilability with Democratic Principles
The greatest problem, often downplayed or overlooked in the
literature, 145 is the inherently undemocratic nature of extraterritorial
laws. 146 Under basic democratic principles and norms, government
must rest upon the consent of the governed. 147 Outsiders may not
dictate the law to a political community that has not consented to it.148
145. A notable exception is Lea Brilmayer, who considers these issues in her political rights
or political theory approach to conflict of laws. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and
Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1280 (1989) ("This article attempts both to argue in favor of a
general theory about why rights matter and to set out some basic principles, consistent with
commonly held notions of political fairness, about what rights there are."). Admittedly, much
greater attention has been given to democratic principles in the human rights context with the
use of universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of
Idealism, DAEDALUS 47, 51 (Winter 2003) ("Because relevant constituencies cannot hold courts
exercising universal jurisdiction accountable for the negative consequences of their rulings, the
courts themselves will invariably be less disciplined and prudent than would otherwise be the
case."); Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic
Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1065 (2004) ("[T]he task today is to identify democratic principles
appropriate to transnational lawmaking phenomena.").
146. For the few notable exceptions, see Gibney, supra note 24, at 312-13 (describing the
undemocratic nature of extraterritorial laws with regard to non-resident aliens); Mark Gibney &
R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law and the Protection of
Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to Domestic and International Standards,
10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 133 (1996) (explaining that extraterritorial application of the
law is undemocratic and "represents a vastly different conception of the law than what we have
in the domestic realm").
147. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .. "); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 39, at 254 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasizing that the Constitution's
authority would derive from popular consent); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
362 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (suggesting that government authority to
tax can legitimately derive only from the consent of the governed); see also PAULINE MAIER,
AMERICAN SCRIPTURE 128-40 (1997) (describing how the concept of consent of the governed
derives from Lockean notions of social contract and other American writings).
148. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1369-70 (1996) ("We generally accept the notion that the persons within a
geographically defined border are the ultimate source of law-making authority for activities
within that border."); Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional
Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1616 (2005) ("[Ilt is violative of basic democratic principles
for outsiders of the political community to dictate laws to the community."); J.H.H. Weiler, Does
Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos, and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219,
222 (1995) ("[Democracy] is premised on the existence of a polity with members ... by whom and
for whom democratic discourse with its many variants takes place. The authority and legitimacy
of a majority to compel a minority exists only within political boundaries .. "). A number of
international instruments recognize this basic principle of democracy. See, e.g., Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm.,
25th Sess., Agenda Item 85, at 121 (1970); Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention in
the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A.
Res. 2131, U.N GAOR 1st Comm., 20th Sess., Agenda Item 107, at 11 (1965). The problems
associated with the lack of democratic representation in legislation have been recently explored
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But extraterritorial laws do exactly that: they force foreigners (i.e.,
those beyond the state's territorial borders) to bear the costs of
domestic regulation, even though they are nearly powerless to change
those regulations. 149  As Mark Gibney has forcefully argued,
extraterritorial laws "represent[] such a vastly different conception of
law than what exists under the norms and principles of democratic
rule" because extraterritoriality permits "rulemakers in one country..
. to pick and choose which of their own rules they will apply in other
countries. '150 Foreigners are by definition outsiders with no vote and
presumably little formal ability to influence domestic political
processes. 151 The decisionmakers-the domestic courts-are politically
unaccountable to the foreign defendants and apply laws to which the
foreigners have not consented.' 52 For these reasons, extraterritorial
laws are an affront to democratic sovereignty.153
Americans should be particularly concerned about the
democratic legitimacy problems that extraterritorial laws pose now
in the Puerto Rican context. See, e.g., Jos6 R. Coleman Ti6, Six Puerto Rican Congressmen Go to
Washington, 116 YALE L.J. 1389, 1389 (2007) (describing attempts to address "the undemocratic
status of another disenfranchised territory," that is Puerto Rico, which does not have
congressional representation).
149. For a discussion of this, see Parrish, supra note 23, at 407 (discussing the undemocratic
nature of extraterritorial laws in the Canadian-U.S. context).
150. Gibney, supra note 24, at 305.
151. Dodge, Judicial Unilateralism, supra note 11, at 153 (noting that "[floreign interests are
virtually unrepresented in national legislative decisions" because "[t]hey can neither vote in
elections nor contribute to political campaigns"); cf. Jeffery K. Powell, Comment, Prohibitions on
Campaign Contributions from Foreign Sources: Questioning Their Justification in a Global
Interdependent Economy, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 957 (1996) (exploring efforts to curb foreign
political influence by banning or restricting campaign contributions from foreign sources).
152. Post, supra note 77, at 542:
However difficult it may be to argue that individuals or groups have
consented to the application of a territorial state's exercise of power over
them, it is far more difficult to make that argument in the context of the
exercise of state power against those who have no part in constituting the
state's authority.
cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human
Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 346 (1996) ("Even assuming that the defendant-
alien's country has consented to this law on the international plane, there is no evidence that
this consent extends to domestic enforcement in the United States or any other country.").
153. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and
the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 1993 (2004) (describing and criticizing the belief that
"[t]o the extent that a state is subject to law made elsewhere, it has lost its sovereignty, and,
perhaps, in some deep way, its right to call itself a 'state' "); David Post, Against 'Against
Cyberanarchy," 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1385 (2002) (noting how the effects test provides a
source of sovereign authority independent from the consent of the governed, and suggesting that
the consent principle should trump the effects principle as a legitimate source of state power); cf.
Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 457,
464-69 (arguing that human rights litigation and its reliance on customary international law
imposes costs on U.S. democracy).
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that other countries increasingly seek to apply their laws to
Americans. 15 4 Extraterritorial laws are just "a step away from the
'taxation without representation' that so vexed our country's
forefathers." 155 The idea of legislative sovereignty-to be free from the
control of others-was a "cornerstone of developing American political
theory" at the time of independence. 156 Extraterritoriality is also in
tension with modern U.S. aspirations to encourage democracy and
self-rule worldwide. 15 7 The threat to American democratic sovereignty
may be particularly acute if countries that are not liberal democracies
construe their domestic laws to regulate conduct occurring in the
United States.
The democratic legitimacy problem can be viewed in even
simpler terms though. Extraterritorial laws are at odds with common
notions of independent self-governance 158 and the right to self-
determination. 159  Why should American courts-without clear
congressional approval-impose American regulatory policy on the
European Union, Canada, Japan, Mexico, and others?' 60 It is equally
154. See Parrish, supra note 1.
155. Rosen, supra note 148, at 1616.
156. David G. Post, The 'Unsettled Paradox: The Internet, the State, and the Consent of the
Governed, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521, 529 (1998) (citing GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1789, at 346-53 (1969)).
157. See Thomas M. Franck, The Democratic Entitlement, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1994)
(describing a possible global movement towards democracy); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging
Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 47 (1992) (describing a newly emerging
law "which requires democracy to validate governance," and that is "becoming a requirement of
international law, applicable to all and implemented through global standards"). For a discussion
of how international law can promote U.S. interests in promoting democracy, see Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Building Global Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223 (2000).
158. A universal right exists to self-government. See, e.g., American Convention on Human
Rights art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 75, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
159. International law recognizes a right to self-determination at least within the framework
of the existing state system. See U.N. Charter art 2, para. 7 (noting that the UN's purpose is to
"develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples"); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), art
1, 6 ILM 368, 369 (1967) (explaining that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination ... to
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development"); cf. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 218 (Can.) (describing self.
determination as "a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development
within the framework of an existing state"). For an insightful discussion of the interplay of self-
determination and democratic theory, see Russell A. Miller, Self-Determination in International
Law and the Demise of Democracy?, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 601 (2003).
160. In Empagran, the Court was sensitive to these issues when the effects test was not
clearly implicated. F-Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) ("Why
should American law supplant, for example, Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own
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offensive to think that the European Union, Canada, Japan, Mexico,
and others should set economic, environmental, or other regulatory
policy for the United States. Each country has its own interests,
needs, and regulatory objectives. 161
A related fairness concern also exists. People cannot obey the
law unless they know which law to learn. If one is to know "the law
that governs an actor or transaction, [one] must be able to identify,
before act[ing], the one state empowered to govern." 162 It is no answer
that the person "can usually comply with the more restrictive rule,
because that eliminates the political authority of the more permissive
states."163 In sum, if democracy means anything, those whose conduct
is to be controlled by a particular law must have some voice (directly,
or through some form of representation) in determining the substance
of those laws. 164 Extraterritorial laws ignore all of this.165
determination about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from
anticompetitive conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other
foreign companies?").
161. Eric Posner has made this point recently in the context of climate change litigation. Eric
A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal 14
(Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 329, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=959748.
162. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 319 (1992).
163. Id.; see also Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 2-3, F-Hoffmann-Laroche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (2004 WL
226389) (expressing Canada's interest in extraterritorial application of U.S. law); Brief of the
Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6-7, F-Hoffmann-Laroche,
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (2004 WL 226390) (discussing the rise of the nation-
state and sovereignty); Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 2, F-Hoffmann-Laroche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)
(2004 WL 226597) (opposing the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases).
164. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."); cf. THE FEDERALIST
No. 52 (James Madison) (arguing that greater exercises of power require more frequent voter
participation). The Supreme Court's voting cases underscore the importance of the right to have
a voice. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("No right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined."). But see David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The New "Civic Virtue" of the Internet:
A Complex Systems Model for the Governance of Cyberspace, in THE EMERGING INTERNET 23
(1998), available at http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/Newcivicvirtue.html (determining
that representative democracy is not an appropriate model for cyberspace governance).
165. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May
22, 2000, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfrcti/tgiparis20000522.htm (involving the
American corporation Yahoo!). David Post has made this point. See Thomas E. Baker, A
Roundtable Discussion with Lawrence Lessig, David G. Post, and Jeffrey Rosen, 49 DRAKE L.
REV. 441, 444 (2001) (quoting Professor Post's response to a question regarding the Yahoo!
situation).
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That the democracy deficit extraterritorial laws open up has
not created a greater stir is surprising given how strictly our
Constitution is tied to territory. Contrary to the dramatic growth of
extraterritorial laws, constitutional interpretation has become
increasingly wedded to territory, at least since the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.166 The U.S.
Constitution has no formal extraterritorial effect. 167 Outside U.S.
territorial borders, aliens are not protected by the Constitution,1 68 and
U.S. actors are not bound by constitutional constraints. 169 Based on
the idea of a social contract and self-government, current doctrine
finds that outsiders have no claim to invoke constitutional rights. 170
166. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269-71 (1990) (explaining that
"aliens receive constitutional protections [only] when they have come within the territory of the
United States and [have] developed substantial connections with this country"); see Gerald L.
Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 912 (1991) (describing the different
approaches to Constitutional interpretation and explaining how the "principles determining the
Constitution's coverage have been sharply controverted during [the last] two hundred years, and
different approaches have been dominant at different times").
167. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1950) (rejecting claim that
aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment protections outside of U.S. sovereign territory); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893) (resonating in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance
of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens.")). For cases decided
by the Supreme Court more recently, see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (holding that
aliens within U.S. territory are "persons" entitled to Due Process Clause protections); Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (noting that "certain constitutional protections available to
persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders");
see also Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2506 ("[T]he protections of the Bill of Rights are not
untethered from the territory of the United States. Rather they are spatially bound: operative
only within the fifty states and other territories unequivocally possessed by the United States.").
168. Cf. ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
ALIENS 53 (1985) ("Once aliens are within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
however, the situation changes dramatically: They are then entitled to most of the rights
guaranteed in the Constitution. The importance of'territorial presence' is thus overriding .... ").
169. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75 (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment does not constrain government action abroad). Gerald Neuman has perhaps been
the most prolific scholar on these issues. See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 108 (1996) ("[T]he mutuality of
obligation approach affords the express protections of fundamental law, to the extent that their
terms permit, as a condition for subjecting a person to the nation's law."); Gerald L. Neuman,
Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
2073, 2076-77 (2005) (noting how the Court has rejected a mutuality of obligation approach);
Neuman, supra note 166, at 981-92 (explaining how the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected a
mutuality of obligation approach).
170. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 487
(1987) ("To the extent that the Constitution is a social contract establishing a system of self-
government, permanent outsiders.., seem to have little claim to invoke constitutional 'rights.'
"); Neuman, supra note 166, at 984-86 (describing the Rehnquist Court's reliance on a restrictive
social contract theory as a Hobbesian approach to the Constitution).
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Indeed, that courts have steadfastly refused in recent years 171 to
extend constitutional rights outside U.S. territory is another reason
why courts should be nervous about subjecting foreigners to U.S.
laws. 172
The democratic legitimacy issue cannot be shrugged off easily.
Other countries' laws are different than ours and often conflict with
our conception of justice. 173 A few examples underscore the point.
While U.S. antitrust laws are interpreted to "protect competition, not
competitors," other nations often support protectionist measures.
74
Other nations also do not always embrace free speech in quite the
same way as our First Amendment requires. 175 Americans hardly
171. In recent cases alleging torture and illegal detention at Guantinamo Bay, courts that
have found detainees entitled to fundamental constitutional rights have done so because
"Guant~namo Bay must be considered the equivalent of a U.S. territory .. " In re Guantdnamo
Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005); see also Almurbati v. Bush, 366 F. Supp.
2d 72, 80 n.6 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing In re Guantdnamo Detainee Cases). See Neuman, supra note
169, at 2073 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court's Rasul opinion "strongly suggests in a footnote
that foreign nationals in U.S. custody at Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base... possess constitutional
rights"). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush, lower courts denied
GuantAnamo Bay detainees the right to file habeas petitions because they were detained outside
the territories of the United States and therefore lacked legal protection. Al Odah v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140-42 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Coal. of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036,
1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 481-82 (2002); see also Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v.
Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1417, 1428-29 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that Haitian and Cuban
aliens outside U.S. territory could not assert various statutory and constitutional rights).
172. Gerald Neuman makes the reverse point, arguing that because U.S. laws are applied
abroad, constitutional protections must apply as well. Neuman, supra note 169, at 2077. The
Court has consistently rejected Neuman's invitation to embrace a mutuality of obligation
approach to constitutionalism. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to use a mutuality principle); Raustiala, supra note 7,
at 225-26 (examining the Supreme Court's decision in In re Ross that the Constitution's reach
was limited to U.S. territory).
173. That law is embedded in the culture and history of a nation and its peoples is beyond
debate. See, e.g., 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 46 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1945) (1835) (explaining that social condition is the source of laws); Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism
and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1995-99 (2004) (arguing that Americans and
Europeans have fundamentally different constitutional conceptions). Although perhaps
overplayed, this point has been emphasized in the debate over using foreign law in U.S. Supreme
Court decisions (i.e., that borrowing is problematic). See Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup:
The U.S. Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 637, 651-52 (explaining the
argument that "citing foreign law is somehow inconsistent with sovereignty").
174. Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 77 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 370, 373 (1983) (describing differences in antitrust regulation in the United States and
elsewhere).
175. For example, a French court ordered Yahoo.com to block access to websites selling Nazi
memorabilia or otherwise assisting in the denial of the holocaust. Tribunal de grande instance
[T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000, available at
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/ctiltgiparis20000522.htm; see also Berman, Globalization of
Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 337-42, 516-20 (describing the Yahoo! case).
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should be shocked that other countries do not react well to
extraterritorial laws that they perceive to be a form of American
imperialism. 176 And, not surprisingly, as demonstrated by Europe's
recent extraterritorial regulation of Americans, 177 Americans are not
fond of other countries' extraterritorial laws either. 178
2. Other Incipient Harms
Even if some form of democratic theory could support
extraterritorial regulation of other nation's citizens, extraterritorial
domestic laws have other problems. As an initial matter, they create
piecemeal solutions to global problems. Instead of creating a
comprehensive regulatory scheme through compromise and state-to-
state negotiation, extraterritoriality inevitably leads to inconsistent
adjudications as different courts from different countries approach
international issues using different laws and procedures. 179 In many
contexts, such ad hoc and unilateral approaches run counter to
conventional wisdom that global problems require international
solutions.180
176. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Dick Armey, European Regulations Tormenting U.S., CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 2006,
at C23 (explaining how Europe is using regulations as anti-competitive tools to punish American
companies like Microsoft and Apple); Brussels Rules OK" How the European Union is Becoming
the World's Chief Regulator, ECONOMIST (U.S.), Sept. 22, 2007, at 66 (describing differences in
American and European regulatory approaches and noting how the EU is setting global
regulatory standards).
178. For recent examples of laws at which Americans have bristled, see Leigh Davison &
Debra Johnson, Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Unilateralism: A Critical Commentary on the
EU's Triple-Track Approach to the International Dimension of Competition Policy, EUR. BUS.
REV., Dec. 6, 2007 (describing the unilateral application of EU competition law through the
effects doctrine); Graham Maher, Cartel Conduct to be a Criminal Offence in Australia, MONDAQ
Bus. BRIEFING, Feb. 17, 2008 (describing proposed amended Trade Practices Act, which
criminalizes conduct wholly outside of Australia); Proskauer Rose LLP's Labor & Employment
Practice Group, U.S. Companies with Operations in Europe Must Comply with Data Protection
Laws, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Jan. 3, 2008 (describing extraterritorial reach of EU data privacy
laws, and how those laws are "completely alien to American companies").
179. For examples of how litigation can lead to patchwork solutions, see Paul L. Langer,
Significant Current Developments in Environmental Insurance Coverage, 690 PRAC. L. INST. 129
(1994) (describing how a "litigation explosion" over the insurance coverage aspects of
environmental liability has led to a "patchwork of inconsistent and often conflicting decisions");
cf. Abate, supra note 139, at 130 (noting that a drawback to climate change litigation may be the
patchwork, rather than comprehensive, nature of litigation solutions); Jonathan Turley, A Crisis
of Faith: Tobacco and Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 471-80 (2000)
(describing problems created by the patchwork solutions caused by mass tort litigation and
calling for national standards).
180. The move to harmonization laws underscores this point. See supra note 179 (discussing
consequences of a lack of harmonization).
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The costs of piecemeal solutions are significant. As states
increasingly apply their laws extraterritorially, the overlapping
jurisdictions lead not only to state-to-state conflict but also create
expensive uncertainties for business and public institutions.1 8 1 Global
corporations must be aware of, and comply with, a wide variety of
laws, sometimes from countries far removed from where their
businesses operate. These patchwork laws encourage overregulation 8 2
and make compliance with regulations difficult. In short,
extraterritorial laws are largely antithetical to the core functions of
jurisdictional rules-to increase predictability and reduce transaction
costs.
A related legitimacy concern exists. Foreigners rarely perceive
extraterritorial laws to be legitimate (nor do U.S. citizens when other
countries' laws are applied to them). Courts that try to regulate
conduct occurring abroad are open to the accusation of having
parochial biases with the appearance,18 3 if not the reality, of favoring
local interests.18 4 Additionally, unique features of U.S. litigation-
"juries, discovery, class actions, contingent fees, and often substantive
American law"-are "perceived as pro-plaintiff and selected under
similar pro-plaintiff choice of law rules."'1 5  In short, foreign
181. Gerber, supra note 17, at 288.
182. Guzman, supra note 44, at 906-09 (arguing that extraterritoriality always leads to
systematic overregulation); see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 24, at 574 (describing the
difficulties that concurrent jurisdiction can produce, including imposing conflicting legal
obligations and causing "confiscatory or otherwise crippling results").
183. Some commentators have suggested that, in reality, foreigners fare well in U.S. courts.
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARv.
L. REV. 1120, 1121-22, 1143 (1996) (exploring reasons why foreigners fear U.S. courts, but
concluding, based on empirical data, that foreign litigants do not fare badly); Christopher A.
Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance: The Politics of Private International Law 90
(2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University), available at
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspacebitstream/10161/452/1[D-Whytock-Christopher-a-200712.
pdf (considering nationality as "a political factor that may influence how domestic courts allocate
governance authority").
184. Born, supra note 6, at 95; Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical
Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving
Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 35 (1996) (describing perceived bias against foreign citizens in
U.S. courts); Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497, 1497,
1504 (2003) (describing the widespread perception that "American courts are hostile to foreign
parties").
185. Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the
Proposed Hague Judgments Convention be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 320 (2002); see also
Posch, supra note 16, at 373-74 (discussing European aversion to American legal fee structure
and right to jury trial); Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a
Worldwide Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: Some
Initial Lessons, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE
263, 267 (John J. Barcelo, III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002) (noting that "United States
judgments are feared in the rest of the world," and that there exists "genuine concern over the
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defendants are concerned that extraterritoriality permits plaintiffs to
illegitimately forum shop for favorable law in the United States 8 6 or
to otherwise impose greater costs upon them.187 The perception that
extraterritorial laws are illegitimate therefore frustrates judgment
enforcement and harmonization of enforcement standards.
Of course, extraterritorial laws can also result in foreign
retaliation. Other nations may view extraterritorial laws as "a symbol
of humiliation" and are "extraordinarily sensitive to other countries'
assertions of jurisdiction that seem to impinge on the sacred domain of
national sovereignty."'' 8 8 To the extent that the United States is seen
as aggressively using domestic law to assert its hegemony globally, we
can expect that others will do the same.189 Other states will often find
it to their advantage to apply their laws extraterritorially-if only
because failure to do so amounts to a kind of unilateral disarmament
against U.S. extraterritorial laws. And at the logical extreme, each
state will have incentives to regulate broadly, creating an anarchic
free-for-all in which each nation will aggressively regulate so long as it
can withstand the political risks. In fact, extraterritorial laws permit
lesser powers to exert greater international influence than they would
otherwise be able to through political processes.
Countries also have a wide range of options to try to prevent
the effective extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, including:
diplomatic protests, 90 nonrecognition of judgments,1 91 and enactment
assertion of jurisdiction by United States courts because of the size of the awards that juries in
the United States are believed to grant in civil litigation").
186. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Internationalization of Law and Legal Practice: Forum
Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 554-56 (1989) (explaining how
exorbitant jurisdictional practices in the United States provide an incentive to forum shop).
187. George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 SUP. CT.
REV. 347, 372 (2001) ("Choosing between national legal systems creates greater risks of...
impos[ing] costs upon the defendant . .
188. Dam, supra note 174, at 371.
189.Bradley, supra note 153, at 461 (explaining how in the human rights context "other
nations may retaliate by allowing suits against U.S. government actors"); Grundman, supra note
3, at 258 (explaining how because of retaliation, U.S. multinational corporations are left in a
vulnerable position); Stephan, supra note 1, at 655 ("The problem lies in the unwillingness of
foreign states, including their judiciary, to go along with our project and their ability to sabotage
it."); see also Parrish, supra note 16, at 49-50 (describing retaliation when a "U.S. court provides
a forum for a foreign plaintiff injured in his or her home nation"); Parrish, supra note 23, at 409-
11 (discussing reciprocity and retaliation in the context of extraterritorial environmental laws).
190. For example, the European Community and the United Kingdom submitted protests
when the United States amended its Export Administration Regulations to prohibit the export of
oil or natural gas exploitation equipment to the Soviet Union. AV. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS 197, 201 (1983):
The United States measures as they apply in the present case are
unacceptable under international law because of their extra-territorial
aspects. They seek to regulate companies not of United States nationality in
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of blocking 192 or claw-back statutes. 193 The impact is concrete;
retaliation interferes with U.S. regulatory objectives and destroys any
"spirit of cooperation and common purpose in solving international
economic problems" that might exist. 194 U.S. foreign relations are
respect of their conduct outside the United States and particularly the
handling of property and technical data of these companies not in the United
States.
(quoting diplomatic notes).
191. See ROBERT E. LUTZ, A LAWYER'S HANDBOOK FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 2 (2007) (assisting lawyers "seeking to enforce a foreign
judgment in the United States or a U.S.-rendered judgment abroad in navigating this lack of
uniformity"). For a discussion of extraterritoriality and its connection to judgment enforcement,
see Berman, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 7, at 944-45 (arguing that "it is clear that
judgment recognition is increasingly the place where deterritorialized jurisdictional assertions
meet the reality of territorial enforcement").
192. See, e.g., Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign
Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61, 81-92 (1999) (discussing blocking statutes);
William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
BUS. 363, 363 (2001) (discussing blocking statutes); Dodge, Judicial Unilateralism, supra note
11, at 169 n.357 (noting that the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Norway,
Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Canada, and South Africa have all enacted blocking legislation to
U.S. antitrust laws); Deborah Senz & Hilary Charlesworth, Building Blocks: Australia's
Response to Foreign Extraterritorial Legislation, 2 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 69, 72-80 (2001)
(describing Australian, as well as European and Canadian, responses to U.S. economic
sanctions); cf. John W. Boscariol, An Anatomy of a Cuban Pyjama Crisis: Reconsidering Blocking
Legislation in Response to Extraterritorial Trade Measures of the United States, 30 LAW & POLy'
INT'L BUS. 439, 442-50 (1999) (describing Canadian blocking legislation in response to U.S.
extraterritorial measures); Michael A. Gerstenzang, Insider Trading and the
Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 409, 423 (1989)
(explaining that French blocking laws "forbidJ nationals, and certain others with ties to France,
from divulging economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters to foreign
authorities except as provided by international agreement").
193. A clawback statute "enables certain defendants who have paid a multiple damage
judgment in an overseas country to recover the multiple portion of that judgment from the
successful plaintiff." Joseph E. Neuhaus, Note, Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British
Clawback Statute Under International Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1097-98 (1981). For
examples of blocking and clawback statutes in the Canadian context, see Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985); see also Andrew C. Dekany, Canada's Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act: Using Canadian Criminal Sanctions to Block U.S. Anti-Cuban
Legislation, 28 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 210, 210-15 (1997); William C. Graham, The Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act, 11 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 410, 410-13 (1986); cf. Mitsuo Matsushita
& Aya Iino, The Blocking Legislation as a Countermeasure to the U.S. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:
A Comparative Analysis of the EC and Japanese Damage Recovery Legislation, 40 J. WORLD
TRADE 753, 762, 766-69 (2006).
194. Dam, supra note 119, at 324; see also President Thabo Mbeki, Statement to the
National Houses of Parliament and the Nation, at the Tabling of the Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/ (follow
"Speeches" hyperlink; then follow "President" hyperlink; then follow "2003" hyperlink; then
follow "15 Apr 2003" hyperlink) ("[W]e consider it completely unacceptable that matters that are
central to the future of our country should be adjudicated in foreign courts which bear no
responsibility for the well-being of our country. . ").
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burdened similarly. 195 An exorbitant jurisdictional assertion, or at
least the appearance of it, ''can readily arouse foreign resentment,"
"provoke diplomatic protests," "trigger commercial or judicial
retaliation, and threaten friendly relations in unrelated fields."196
III. AN APPROACH: A RETURN TO TERRITORIALITY
To minimize the dangers of extraterritoriality, this Article
advocates an approach that is both controversial and modest.
Controversially, it takes a position that many scholars have rejected.
Indeed, finding scholars who champion territorial limitations on
legislative jurisdiction is difficult. Modestly, however, it seeks a return
to those principles, based on territorial limits, that for centuries
sensibly dictated the contours of legislative jurisdiction.
A. Embracing Territoriality and Constraining Effects
Courts should reembrace territoriality and reassess their
overreliance on the effects test when determining legislative
jurisdiction issues. A three-pronged approach commends itself to
resolve legislative jurisdiction questions. This approach is informed
both by pragmatic concerns-supporting long-term American
interests-and also the desire for theoretical consistency focused on
democratic legitimacy.
1. Determining Courts' Prescriptive Jurisdiction
The initial question is whether Congress intended to regulate
extraterritorially-whether the court has prescriptive jurisdiction over
the particular conduct. Courts should meaningfully apply the
presumption of territoriality and continue to find that Congress has
not regulated outside U.S. borders absent clear and unmistakable
195. See Bradley, supra note 153, at 472 (describing the costs to U.S. foreign relations that
human rights litigation imposes); Gerber, supra note 19, at 187 (describing the negative impacts
of extraterritorial laws); Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 18, at 106 (describing how domestic
human rights litigation can impact foreign affairs).
196. Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1, 28-29 (1987); cf. Bradley, supra note 153, at 472 (describing how human rights
litigation in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute can often cause "foreign relations
damage" and retaliation); Holly A. Ellencrig, Expanding Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Defendants: A Response to Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 363,
368-69 (noting the need for uniformity in personal jurisdiction law "because of the implications
of foreign relations").
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legislative intent.197 This would provide greater respect for the
prerogatives of other nations. More importantly, it would serve long-
term American interests by discouraging other nations from
extraterritorially imposing their laws on Americans.
One way to ensure meaningful adherence to the presumption of
territoriality would be to require a clear statement of congressional
intent. A clear statement rule is hardly foreign to the Supreme Court
when interests of other sovereigns are at stake.19 Certainly this is
true in the international context. 199 In the domestic context, too,
routinely courts require clear evidence of legislative intent prior to
finding that legislation might impose on state sovereign
prerogatives. 20 0  The clear or plain statement rule is an
acknowledgment that Congress will not readily interfere with the
197. Notably, this is consistent with the language of many of the leading Supreme Court
cases. See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 120-21 (2005) (requiring a
clear statement before a statute is found to apply to a foreign-flag vessel's internal affairs and
operations); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 176 (1993) (requiring "affirmative
evidence" that Congress intended an extraterritorial application of a statute); Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (requiring
"clearly expressed" intent for a statute to apply beyond U.S. borders); Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (holding that Labor Management Relations Act did not
apply to labor dispute involving foreign-flagged ship because Congress had not "clearly
expressed" its "affirmative intention" to reach conduct beyond U.S. territory).
198. The clear statement rule has often been invoked as a way to provide Congress with a set
of canons of construction. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) ("Whatever
we say regarding ... a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress. What is of
paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.").
199. The U.S. Supreme Court usually construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable
interference with other nations' territorial sovereignty. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963) (involving application of National Labor
Relations Act to foreign-flag vessels); Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382-
83 (1959) (involving application of Jones Act in maritime case); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571, 576-78 (1953) (same).
200. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1996) (requiring
"unmistakably clear" statement from Congress before finding Congress intended to abrogate
state sovereign immunity); Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518-20 (1992)
(finding presumption against federal preemption of traditional state functions absent clear
statement); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (requiring particularly clear
statement before finding federal regulation of core state functions); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (finding that a clear statement is required to compel states to
entertain damages suits against themselves in state courts); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985) (finding that if Congress intends to alter the "usual constitutional
balance between the States and the Federal Government," it must make its intention to do so
"unmistakably clear in the language of the statute"); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (requiring clear statement of Congress before imposing
conditions on the grant of federal monies to the states); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947) (finding Congress must make its intention "clear and manifest" if it intends to
pre-empt the historic powers of the States).
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sovereign powers of others. 20 1 And in state-to-state relations, the
extraterritoriality principle formally prohibits American states from
regulating conduct of noncitizens occurring in other American
states. 202
To the extent a presumption and a clear statement rule make
sense in the domestic context, 203 they make greater sense when
dealing with foreign sovereigns. Although the degree to which states
retain sovereignty in our federal system is a subject of debate,204
certainly no one disputes that foreign countries have not idly
relinquished sovereignty to the United States. Moreover, where any
doubt lingers as to the appropriate limits of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, the presumption permits courts to avoid 20 5 those thorny
201. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 593 (1992) (cataloguing the vast areas of law in which the Court has used presumptions
and clear statement rules); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism after Raich: The Case for
Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823 (2005) (describing the benefits of clear
statement rules in the Commerce Clause context).
202. The extraterritoriality principle holds that a state "may not 'project its legislation into
[other States].'" Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582-83
(1986) (alteration in original) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935));
see also Peter C. Felmly, Comment, Beyond the Reach of States: The Dormant Commerce Clause,
Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 483-85
(2003) (describing the extraterritoriality principle and arguing that it should be separated from
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause inquiries); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1520-21 (2007) (describing the general prohibition
against extraterritorial regulation, but noting that it is formal in nature and not absolute and
arguing that some extraterritoriality is inevitable and appropriate).
203. Admittedly, the states are different for constitutional reasons, so the analogy only goes
so far. Compare Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1865, 1888 (1987) (describing the extraterritoriality prohibition as an inherent attribute of
federalism), with Mark P. Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1735, 1735 (1988) (criticizing Regan's territorial approach).
204. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 418-604 (5th ed. 2003); Laycock, supra note 162, at 259-60 (explaining how the
states gave up sovereignty and are forbidden to treat one another as foreign countries).
205. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) ("[Where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."); see also Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (describing different versions of the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1575-76 (2000) (describing constitutional
avoidance doctrines). For a provocative article describing constitutional avoidance for executive
branch actors, see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006).
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questions that the Fifth Amendment and foreign relations raise (the
latter of which the courts may be least equipped to address). 20 6
Yet the Supreme Court need not go so far as to embrace a clear
statement rule to improve its current legislative jurisdiction
jurisprudence, and there may be good reasons not to.20 7 What is
essential is that there be some indisputable evidence that Congress
intended to regulate conduct occurring abroad. Even evidence of intent
from legislative history or the statute's context might suffice.208 What
does not suffice, however, is an assumption of extraterritoriality based
solely on the fiction that Congress inevitably intended to regulate if
adverse effects are felt within U.S. territory.20 9 Nor is it appropriate to
assume the law applies extraterritorially based on generally broad
statutory language unrelated to the law's geographic scope. 210 When
congressional intent cannot be reasonably ascertained, the wise rule-
given the perils of extraterritoriality-is to assume only a domestic
application and reassert the continuing validity of the territoriality
presumption.
206. That due process restrictions apply to the extraterritorial application of U.S. jurisdiction
was argued most famously in a 1992 article. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 2, at 1242. For one
scholar's challenge to this argument, see Weisburd, supra note 32, at 379. For the courts ability
to address questions implicating foreign relations, see Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (noting that the "Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities
nor responsibility" for decisions relating to international relations).
207. Clear statement rules have been criticized as the tool of an activist conservative court to
construct barriers to change. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 201, at 593; see also WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 142 (Supp. 1992)
("Consistent with its move toward textualism, the Court has ... transformed an old
presumption... that could be rebutted by a contrary statutory purpose or legislative history,
into a clear statement rule, rebuttable only by clear statutory text."); David L. Shapiro,
Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 958-59 (1992) (noting
the "extraordinary burdens" the clear statement rules put on the legislative process); Note, Clear
Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1959
(1994) (noting the criticism of clear statement rules, and describing the Court's federalism
jurisprudence).
208. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (examining "all available
evidence" of congressional intent); see also Kollias v. D&G Marine Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir.
1994) (looking at non-textual sources, including legislative history); Gushi Bros. v. Bank of
Guam, 28 F.3d 1535, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (looking for express statement of congressional intent
in the language of the statute or its legislative history); Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm'ns
Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (looking to legislative history).
209. Note how this departs dramatically from what many scholars have urged. See, e.g.,
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption, supra note 11, at 124 (arguing that presumption is
rebutted when effects are felt in the United States). For the response to critics, see infra Section
III.B.
210. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding law
applied based on congressional intent to remedy harm, not based on language related to the
statute's geographical application).
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Notably, this is not-as some have mistakenly suggested-to
prefer "the law of the place where the acts occurred."211 The
presumption does not implicate conflict of laws or try to resurrect the
long-dead theory of vested rights. 212 The issue is not whether
American law applies when in conflict with another nation's law, or
whether a conflict even exists. The issue is whether American law was
intended to govern the conduct at all. The idea is based much more on
notions of legislative primacy and the practical considerations of
avoiding foreign resentment. 213
Reinvigorating the presumption against extraterritoriality
would also serve more than the interests of comity, although other
countries might welcome such a development. While often phrased in
these terms, comity does not command the presumption.214 Instead, it
is self-interest (i.e., American interest) that drives this result. A
presumption of territoriality serves American interests by creating a
precedent that rejects the use of extraterritorial laws against
Americans.21 5 Clear benefits would inure from this approach. It would
not only reduce possible conflicts and increase predictability in law,216
but would also insulate the judiciary from claims that it is usurping
211. Kramer, supra note 6, at 211. This mistaken suggestion is mirrored in arguments by
Brainerd Currie when discussing the related, but different, area of conflict of laws. CURRIE,
supra note 67, at 81-121.
212. Lea Brilmayer has made the point well that rules respective of territoriality and
political rights need not involve a return to vested rights. BRILMAYER, supra note 44, at 247-59.
213. The Court has repeatedly asserted the need to be cognizant of foreign retaliation and
potential foreign embarrassment in a range of contexts. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 695 (2004) (noting the potential implications for foreign relations in the Alien Tort
Statute context and the need to be "particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the
Legislative and Executive branches"); Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004) (noting need
for international comity in foreign sovereign immunity context); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 103 (1987) (emphasizing the need to consider foreign relations
policies in a personal jurisdiction analysis); Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
439 (1964) (noting how separation of powers and the need to avoid impinging on the executive
prerogative in matters of foreign relations underpins the act of state doctrine).
214. See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 120 (2005) (finding as "a
matter of international comity, a clear statement of congressional intent is necessary before a
general statutory requirement can interfere with matters that concern a foreign-flag vessel's
internal affairs and operation").
215. American industry certainly believes that this benefit would exist. See, e.g., Brief of the
Nat'l Mining Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco
Metals Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (2007 WL 1319338) (expressing fear of retaliatory
actions by foreign jurisdictions); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d
1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (2007 WL 1318991) (noting the same fear as above); Brief of Consumer
Elecs. Ass'n Supporting Petitioners at 2, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066
(9th Cir. 2006) (2007 WL 1318990) (fearing "tit for tat" retaliation by foreign jurisdictions).
216. Cf. Laycock, supra note 162, at 319 ("No set of choice-of-law rules has yet achieved a
high degree of predictability in hard cases, but only territorial rules offer any hope.").
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legislative authority. More importantly, the approach would
undermine the growing global assumption that extraterritorial laws
are an appropriate way to resolve global challenges 217-an assumption
that threatens American independence and democratic sovereignty. At
minimum it would provide U.S. litigants and the U.S. government
some credibility when complaining about other states' exorbitant
jurisdictional assertions. 218
Admittedly, courts would be hard pressed to overturn hundreds
of decisions that have found legislation to apply extraterritorially in
certain narrow contexts. For those few statutes that have long been
interpreted as applying extraterritorially, the doctrine of legislative
acquiescence may well control. 219 Under the doctrine of legislative
acquiescence, if a court has interpreted a statute to apply
extraterritorially, and the legislature has done nothing over an
extended period of time, it can be assumed that the court achieved the
correct interpretation. 220 But only in this extremely narrow category of
cases, where stare decisis concerns override, should the court continue
to apply the effects test as a basis for assuming legislative intent.
This approach, reinvigorating territoriality, is not too far from
the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements. The presumption
217. See supra notes 82-122 and accompanying text for examples.
218. In the past, the United States has been successful in exporting U.S. jurisdictional rules
abroad.
219. For a general discussion of the doctrine of legislative acquiescence and related
doctrines, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 400-01 (1991) (defending the Court's periodic reliance on
legislative acquiescence); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 241-52 (1994) (describing significance of legislative inaction). Compare
Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It". The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare
Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 183 (1989) (arguing against ever overruling statutory precedents),
with Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
422, 426-29 (1988) (offering reasons why congressional inaction should not be interpreted as
legislative acquiescence to a judicial decision).
220. As Justice Harlan Fiske Stone once wrote for the Court: "The long time failure of
Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed ... is persuasive of legislative
recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one." Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 488 (1940); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983)
("Congress' awareness of the denial of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools when
enacting other and related legislation make out an unusually strong case of legislative
acquiescence in and ratification by implication of the 1970 and 1971 rulings."); Ill. Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) ("In considering whether to cut back or abandon [a rule], we
must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory
construction, where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation.");
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972) (treating Congress's failure, over fifty years, to reject
or adjust the Supreme Court's prior interpretation of antitrust law's application to major league
baseball as ratifying that interpretation); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 (1945)
(Rutledge, J., concurring) (recognizing the recent tendency to interpret Congressional silence as
acquiescence, but cautioning against an inflexible presumption).
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against extraterritoriality was reembraced in Empagram, where the
Court strictly construed an antitrust statute to avoid extraterritorial
application when foreign conduct did not directly affect U.S.
markets. 221 The Court should continue that trend.222
2. The Scope of Congress's Legislative Jurisdiction
The second inquiry relates to the scope of Congress's legislative
jurisdiction. If Congress has spoken unmistakably and regulated
extraterritorially, a court need only determine whether the regulation
is constitutionally within congressional power (and valid under
international law). 223 It is in this second prong that the effects test
should come into play. Only when a substantial direct effect is felt
within the United States does Congress have the power to regulate the
conduct of noncitizens occurring abroad.
Using the effects test to define the outer limits of congressional
action makes a great deal of sense under international law.
Customary international law prohibits a country from causing
221. F-Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 174 (2004) (instructing that
as long as a "statute's language reasonably permits an interpretation" that avoids
extraterritorial application, a court "should adopt it"); cf. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385,
394 (2005) (holding that a general term such as "any court" presumptively "refers only to
domestic courts, not to foreign courts").
222. The Court has reaffirmed the continuing applicability of the presumption numerous
times. For recent cases, see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1758 (2007)
(applying the presumption against extraterritoriality); Small, 544 U.S. at 389 (reaffirming the
presumption against extraterritoriality). But see Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349,
373-75 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority ignores the presumption
against extraterritoriality). For cases from the 1990s applying the presumption, see Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509
U.S. 155, 173 (1993); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-04 (1993); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 585-86 (1992).
223. The U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally been skeptical of international law playing
any role in the legislative jurisdiction analysis. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S.
280, 285-86 (1952) ("The United States is not debarred by any rule of international law ....
[T]here is no question of international law, but solely of the purport of the municipal law which
establishes the duty of the citizen in relation to his own government." (quoting Skiriotes v.
Florida, 383 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487,
495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Federal courts must give effect to a valid, unambiguous congressional
mandate, even if such effect would conflict with another nation's laws or violate international
law."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945):
[W]e are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to
the conduct outside the United States of persons not in allegiance to it. That
being so, the only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the
liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so: as a court of
the United States, we cannot look beyond our own law.
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substantial transboundary harm. 224 And states must take into account
other states' interests when exercising their own sovereignty. 225 The
landmark Trail Smelter arbitration, in its now famous proclamation of
the "no-harm principle," explained it this way:
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence.
2 2 6
If another state has caused transboundary harm (i.e., its activities
have caused a substantial effect outside its territory), then the harmed
state can appropriately seek to remedy that harm through
extraterritorial legislation if it so decides.
Effects jurisdiction can thus be valid, but it should be used
cautiously, and not without considerable thought first by the political
branches of government. A poorly considered policy could lead to
unproductive tit-for-tat reciprocal actions. Of course, nothing in the
Constitution prevents Congress from regulating extraterritorially-no
Fifth Amendment or other due process concerns exist if substantial
effects are felt within the United States.227 Moreover, international
224. EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (2d ed.
2006). The international community has long recognized the importance of the no-harm rule. Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development princ. 2, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874
(recognizing the no-harm principle); Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment princ. 21, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (recognizing the no-harm principle).
225. See Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 870 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1928) (explaining that a state must consider the interests, and respect the rights, of other
states). Many international cases recognize the no-harm and good neighbor principles. See, e.g.,
Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20) (explaining duty to cause no harm); Nuclear
Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20) (explaining duty to cause no harm); Lake Lanoux
Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1957) (holding that a state
can lawfully utilize the waters of an international river in its territory so long as it takes into
account the interests of co-riparian states); Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22
(Apr. 9) (articulating the "well-recognized principle" that it is "every state's obligation not to
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states"); see also
Ginther Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 50, 55-57 (1975) ('The emerging principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
constituted recognition of the fact that territorial sovereign rights in general were correlative
and interdependent and were consequently subject to reciprocally operating limitations.").
226. Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941); see also Trail Smelter
Arbitral Decision, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182, 182 (1939) (providing the Trail Smelter arbitral decision
as reported on April 16, 1938 to the governments of the United States and Canada). For two good
discussions of the arbitration and the no-harm principle, see Alfred P. Rubin, Pollution by
Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. REV. 259, 259 (1971); Karin Mickelson,
Rereading Trail Smelter, 31 CAN. Y.B. INTL L. 219, 222-23 n.12 (1993). The seminal work on the
arbitration is TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL
SMELTER ARBITRATION (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
227. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism
and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. J. INT'L L. 121, 151 (2007)
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law now plainly accepts the effects test as a basis for legislative
jurisdiction. 228 But given that Congress should be nervous about other
countries exporting their laws here, Congress should be exceedingly
careful before exporting our laws into other countries. 229
3. Conflict of Laws and International Comity
The final question is whether a federal statute found to cover
the conduct at issue conflicts with a foreign law that also covers the
same conduct. Only in the conflicts context should comity concerns (or
interest balancing) enter the analysis. 230 The presumption against
territoriality assures that U.S. laws are not applied extraterritorially
unless Congress has clearly spoken. Therefore, comity concerns would
arise only in determining which of two conflicting laws apply.
Exploring what principles should govern conflicts-of-law
analysis in hard cases has been the subject of extended debate that
will not be repeated here. This Article does not seek to envision a new
theory of conflicts of law. Good reasons exist, however, to keep the
conflicts-of-law analysis separate from the legislative jurisdiction
analysis. Conflating the two bypasses the congressional role and
unnecessarily risks assuming regulation of foreign acts. The threat of
foreign extraterritorial laws and the undemocratic underpinnings of
extraterritorial laws demand this caution.
B. Responding to Critics
Before proceeding, there is a point to underscore: advocating
for a territorial approach to legislative jurisdiction and lamenting the
increase of extraterritorial law does not compel the use of territoriality
in other contexts. This Article is not arguing-nor intending to
imply-that territoriality should necessarily constrain application of
constitutional rights or the application of U.S. law to U.S. citizens (i.e.,
the nationality principle). 231 Although politically unpopular, it may
(recognizing extraterritoriality but arguing that "absent this substantial effect, Congress's
authority to extend U.S. law extraterritorially under the Clause is doubtful at best").
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402(1)(c) (1987).
229. For an early warning of these problems, see Jennings, supra note 126, at 175 (asserting
that extraterritorial laws "are an attempt to export into other countries and make operative
there what are after all peculiarly American political notions").
230. See supra notes 113-14, 117-23 and accompanying text (discussing comity and its
relevance to jurisdictional analysis).
231. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2)
& cmt. G (1987): see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-78 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)
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well be appropriate for U.S. laws to limit U.S. action abroad. 23 2
Citizens and domestic corporations should not be able to escape
national regulatory objectives by simply moving certain activities
offshore. States have a legitimate interest in preventing such easy
circumvention of their laws. And the problems with ignoring
territoriality do not apply in situations where the United States holds
its own citizens, and its own government, to domestic standards
abroad. 233 This kind of extraterritoriality is not the subject of this
Article.
The conventional condemnation of territorial limits to
legislative jurisdiction usually takes one of two forms. Neither is
convincing. The first is to portray extraterritorial jurisdiction as an
essential response to wrongdoing for which no other remedy is
available. To embrace territorial limits-the argument goes-would
create an intolerable situation where corporate misconduct and other
malfeasance are ignored. In a globalized world, scholars assert,
territoriality makes little sense. 234 But the premise is wrong.
Embracing territorial limits to domestic laws (or a presumption of
territorial limits) is not to advocate for no regulation. Far from it. In a
modern, global economy, transnational activities usually require some
level of regulation, if not comprehensive regulation. But there is no
(recognizing application of constitutional protections to U.S. citizens abroad while recognizing
and attempting to balance potential limitations); Neuman, supra note 166, at 965-70 (discussing
the competing rationales of the plurality in Reid v. Covert and its subsequent effect on
extraterritorial jurisdiction).
232. In fact, the Court can be criticized in how it has made it more difficult for "Congress to
subject United States companies to new duties and obligations when they are acting
transnationally." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 201, at 616-17. For a discussion of applying
laws to U.S. citizens and thereby competitively disadvantaging local persons, see BRILMAYER,
supra note 44, at 257.
233. This Article is not intending, and does not take, any position on the propriety of limiting
U.S. action abroad. Nor should this Article be perceived as speaking in any way on the actions
taken in Guantinamo Bay. Good reason exists to criticize the handling of Guantdnamo Bay
detainees. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 263
(2004) (examining the propriety of "special tribunals" and the constitutionality of extraterritorial
detentions of suspected terrorists); Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of
Law, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 303 (2002) (exploring why current U.S. executive
policy toward judicial handling of suspected terrorists "pursue[s] a highly problematic armed
conflict alternative to the criminal law paradigm"); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International
Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653, 2654 (2005)
(arguing that law of armed conflict principles should limit presidential war powers as currently
applied to "enemy combatants").
234. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (asserting that the notion that law should be
tied to territory is "an archaic remnant of a preglobalized world"). The assertion is widespread.
For a recent example where a scholar assumes, without analysis, that territorial limits are
nonsensical in a globalized world, see Laura Maranchek Hussain, Enforcing Treaty Rights of
Aliens, 117 YALE L.J. 680, 707 (2008).
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reason to assume that the regulation must be, or is appropriately,
unilateral and domestic in nature.
A remedy can exist for wrongs occurring outside of a state's
territory, without the need for domestic regulation-that is exactly
what international law is for. When the effects test was first conceived
in cases like S.S. Lotus and Alcoa, it may well have been true that
international law was largely unavailable. Now, however, countries
are well accustomed to entering into bilateral or multilateral treaties
to regulate international and transnational activity.235 Literally
thousands of such agreements exist.236 And in recent years-in part
because of the problems created by piecemeal, inconsistent
extraterritorial laws-a renewed interest in harmonized international
regulation has developed. 237 Those who support extraterritorial laws
then have the burden of explaining why international law is not
equipped to address transboundary harms.238 But they have not. In
fact, with some notable exceptions, international law considerations
are almost entirely missing from conflicts-of-law scholarship.
Ultimately, few academics have directly addressed why
territoriality is no longer a viable theory for determining jurisdiction
in international cases. The hostility towards territoriality in the
legislative jurisdiction context often mirrors criticism of territoriality
in other contexts. But just because territoriality may be moribund in
conflicts of law and adjudicative jurisdiction, does not mean that it is
outdated as a limitation on legislative jurisdiction. In fact, given the
problems with extraterritorial laws described above, the opposite is
true.
A second common response to critics of territorial limits on
legislative jurisdiction is to suggest that the default rule should be
reversed until Congress steps in. This position asserts that, in a
globalized world, the courts should assume Congress intended to
regulate conduct occurring outside the United States so long as that
235. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESSES 37-38 (2d
ed. 2006) (describing how "bilateral and multilateral treaties have multiplied at almost
exponential pace").
236. Id. at 37 (explaining that the United Nations Treaty Series contains over "400,000
treaties and related instruments, covering almost every conceivable subject").
237. See Dubinsky, supra note 49, at 312-14 (discussing renewed attempts at
harmonization). Discussion of harmonization is prevalent in both the antitrust and securities
contexts. See, e.g., Sharon E. Foster, While America Slept: The Harmonization of Competition
Laws Based upon the European Union Model, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 467, 498 (2001) (discussing
"U.S. opposition to competition law harmonization" and subsequent foreign reaction).
238. While not the focus of this Article, it is worth emphasizing that international law has




conduct causes effects in U.S. territory, unless Congress clearly states
otherwise. 239  If the courts err in finding a law applies
extraterritorially, scholars argue, Congress can always change it. The
reversal is appealing because it always provides a remedy for a harm.
But reversing the default rule to presume extraterritoriality is
highly problematic. First, institutional constraints suggest that
Congress is in a far better position to speak clearly when it intends its
laws to regulate abroad than to change a law that has been
mistakenly applied extraterritorially. As described above, foreigners
operating abroad are in the worst position to meaningfully petition
Congress to change the law.
Second, the short-term benefits of extraterritorial laws are
more visible than their significant costs, which are often disguised.
When one state regulates for its own benefit, and to the detriment of
others in the world, each state bears a fraction of the costs of the
regulation. The benefits, however, are concentrated entirely in the
regulating state.240 Yet the costs of foreign regulation are difficult to
account for, as the impact of that foreign regulation is often unknown
until after the regulation occurs. Nor is the impact of American
extraterritorial laws immediately obvious. Rather, the impact is
creeping, as other nations slowly begin to embrace extraterritoriality
through the guise of the effects test and apply their laws to regulate
American conduct in the United States.
CONCLUSION
The world has seen a tremendous growth of extraterritorial
laws in recent years. The growth, in large part, is attributable to the
rise of the effects test as the core doctrinal principle that presently
determines the scope of a court's prescriptive jurisdiction. Academics
have mostly encouraged these changes, but this encouragement is
unwise. The effects test has caused significant confusion in the courts,
and the growth of extraterritoriality is deeply problematic. As this
Article has shown, extraterritorial laws are a significant threat to
239. See, e.g., Dodge, Understanding the Presumption, supra note 11, at 104 (arguing that
when an effect is felt in the United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality is
rebutted and regulation should be assumed).
240. This point has been made in recent federalism literature, criticizing the lack of federal
controls on state regulation. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Federalism's Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 93, 95 (2002) (arguing that federalism must "protect states from aggression and exploitation
by other states," and protect against regulatory balkanization); cf. Gardbaum, supra note 70, at
491 (arguing for a re-thinking of the zero-sum conception of state and federal power).
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long-term American interests and represent a fundamentally
undemocratic method of regulation.
These conclusions break sharply with current scholarship. But
this Article's vision is not far-fetched. It merely seeks greater respect
for basic territorial principles that have long provided sensible limits
on legislative jurisdiction. Contrary to what many theorists suggest,
territoriality is not an outdated concept. Rather, in a globalized world,
territorial limits matter even more. Determinate, territorial rules are
essential to maintaining sovereign independence and democratic
legitimacy. And enacting territorially bounded domestic legislation is
a way to prevent other countries from imposing their visions of the
world on us.
Courts would be wise to revisit their overreliance on the effects
test. The effects test should, at most, apply as a limitation on
congressional power, not as a doctrinal command that reverses the
presumption of territoriality. Courts should find that laws regulate
outside U.S. territory only when Congress clearly intends them to.
Congress, however, should be substantially more restrained than it
has been in enacting extraterritorial laws. Unilaterally attempting to
regulate international conduct through domestic rather than
international law is unwise, because it invites other countries to do
the same, threatening American interests. In short, though it
presently captivates courts and commentators alike, one can only hope
that the effects test will fade into obscurity.
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